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ABSTRACT
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS INFLUENCING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER FOR
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN CHINA
by
QIAO Lin
Master of Philosophy
The build-operate-transfer (BOT) contractual arrangement has been actively
promoted by the Chinese Government and is rapidly becoming one of the
prevailing models for basic infrastructure development in China.
Under a BOT arrangement, private investors are responsible for financing,
designing, building, operating and managing a project for a number of years
after its completion; and recoup its construction costs and make a profit out
of the proceeds coming from the operation and commercial exploitation of the
project. At the end of the concession period, the project is transferred to the
government.
International investors can not afford to ignore the scale of the market in
China for infrastructure projects. Their strong will to invest in this market,
combined with the Chinese Government's determination to attract the necessary
funding, will ensure that ways are found to make BOT work. Despite the
tremendous opportunities, undertaking infrastructure business in China involves
many risks and problems, which are mainly caused by China’s embryonic legal
structure and immature market economy. It is therefore important to analyse
the critical success factors (CSFs) associated with BOT projects in China.
This paper presents an analysis of CSFs related to BOT projects in China. A
survey, aiming to iron out the CSFs which may affect the successful
implementation of BOT in China, was conducted to seek the views of
experienced professionals and government officials. Based on the findings of
the survey and case studies, a predictive model of CSFs for BOT projects
implementation in China is proposed.
Some other key issues related to BOT projects in China, such as current
regulations and approval procedures, government initiatives and guarantees, and
competitive tendering system, are also discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction
Except

for

isolated

examples

in

the

last

two

centuries, infrastructure

development has been the responsibility of public agencies. However, the
traditional role of government as the sole provider of railroads, bridges, tunnels,
power generation and transmission facilities is no longer feasible. Private
developers have access to vast amounts of investment capital and, in many
cases, they have better management skills than government administrators, and
so they have gradually taken over government's traditional role.
Facing with severe budgetary constraints, governments have started to encourage
private investors to participate in a number of infrastructure projects. They
have enacted legislation to create new public/private partnerships under various
schemes in these fields. One of these schemes is for the government to make
contract with private developers to finance, build and operate a project that
would normally be undertaken by the government. The contract stimulated that
the ownership of the facility to be returned to the government after a fixed
concession period. Investors are expected to look into the revenues generated
from the completed project as the main source of security for repaying the
debts.

Such

arrangement

forms

the

basis

of the

Build-Operate-Transfer

(hereinafter referred to as “BOT” ） concept.

1.1 The BOT Approach
According to International Trade Law, a BOT project is one in which a
government grants a concession for a period of time to a private consortium
for the development of a project. The consortium is responsible for building,
operating and managing the project for a number of years after its completion
1
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and recoups its construction costs and makes a profit out of the proceeds
coming from the operation and commercial exploitation of the project. At the
end of the concession period, the project is transferred to the government.
Under this arrangement, the repayments of any loans or returns on the
investments made on the project is not guaranteed by the government, but
depends on the revenue generated by the project. Since direct funds from the
public budget are not required, the government of a country will thus
experience reduced pressure of public borrowing, while allowing the transfer of
the industrial risks and also of new technologies to the private sector.
Furthermore, since the project is built and, during the concession period,
operated by the consortium, the government gains the benefit of private sector
expertise in these areas.
Although BOT projects have been largely used in the development of large
infrastructural projects such as telecommunications networks, port facilities,
highways and other public transportation projects, increasingly it is also being
utilized for medium and small scale projects. Thus, the potential exists for
BOT to provide added opportunities for promoting international trade.
The BOT theme has several variations:
(a) Build-Own-Operate (BOO), where the facility is owned by the private
consortium; (b) Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), which is a combination of
BOT and BOO;

(c) Build-Operate-Own and Maintain (BOOM);

and (d)

Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT), where the facility is refurbished， operated
and transferred. Many of these terms are alternative names for BOT projects
and all these contractual arrangements adopt the main functions of the BOT
concept. For the purpose of this dissertation, the term BOT will be used to

2
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cover all forms of concession type contracts.

1.2 Main Characteristics of BOT Projects
Compared to traditional methods of infrastructure development, BOT projects
have several main characteristics (Walker and Smith, 1995):
-

The government does not provide guarantee for the financing of the
projects.

-

The

multiplicity

of

participants

and

their

interrelated

contractual

relationships has resulted in the complexity for BOT project.
-

It takes a long period of time from identification of a suitable project to
the final transfer to the government.

-

It should be noted that BOT as a contractual arrangement tool has
significance for risk allocation.

_ BOT arrangement can provide the host government with very effective
means of acquiring management skills, personnel training and technology
transfer.

1.3 The Advantages of BOT Offering
To the host government:

-

BOT offers the possibility of realizing the much needed infrastructure
projects which would otherwise not have come on stream due to shortage
of budgetary resources and limited sovereign borrowings. Utilizing private
funds

for

public infrastructure

services

helps

to

resources for alternative uses (Walker and Smith, 1995).

3
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-

The main motivation for the private involvement in the BOT projects is
mainly profits that can be derived from operation of the projects. It is to
every party’s benefit to ensure the economic performance of the projects.
Investors will generally tend to put a project in place more quickly and
more efficiently.

-

Because the private investors, in most cases, will operate and maintain the
project during the extended concession period, it will employ up-to-date
technologies and strive to achieve the highest-quality levels.

-

Particularly in developing country, the large foreign firms, through their
interaction

with

local

firms, or

by

osmosis, effect

some

degree

of

technology transfer.
-

BOT arrangement can provide very effective means of the management
skills

and

personnel

training

for

the

host

government. The direct

involvement of private sector provides continuous training program to local
staff before the facilities are transferred back to the host government.
■ BOT contracts as one form of privatization delivers various economic and
political

objectives.

The

strategic

use

of

BOT

concept

in

public

infrastructure provision is an essential move toward liberalization on public
enterprises. It helps to reduce the size of public infrastructure entities and
curb the growing deficit in these sectors. The financial and administrative
burden of the government are decentralized and transferred to private
sector.
-

Perhaps, the most significant advantage of private involvement in infrastructure
development through BOT contracts is the introduction of open and
transparent tendering system. Competition derived among private enterprises
4
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when bidding for BOT concession. Financial and technological innovation and
cost effectiveness are often produced as results of this competition.
To the citizens o f the host country:

-

General taxes will not have to be increased.

-

When

projects

receive

income from tolls, only the users of the BOT

facilities will be required to pay for them. Citizens can elect to use
alternate routes if toll rates are not reasonable, which exerts pressure on
the consortium to keep toll rates as low as possible (Levy, 1996).
To the BOT promoter:

-

The construction and engineering firms and equipment manufacturers as
members of the project promoter have created their own market for their
services and

products.

They

can

anticipate

making

a

profit.

Other

members of the project promoter may receive profits from the operation of
the project; If their market analysis was correct, these profits could be
substantial. Also, by purchasing the land adjacent to the project, the BOT
promoter can make the most of that land’s increased value.

1.4 Application of BOT in the World
Although the term BOT is relatively new, the practice of permitting private
concerns to develop and operate infrastructure projects has been around for
several centuries.

According to

McCarthey

and Perry

(1989)，

the

first

“Concession” was granted for a water system in 1782 in Paris. The most
notable spread in the use of concessions occurred from 1850 onwards in
France and were let in Spain, Italy， Belgium and Germany. Such projects were
called “Concessions” whereby the government would allow a private company

5
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or consortium to design, finance, construct, and operate the particular project for
a certain concession period. The concessionaire would assume responsibility for
the completeness of design, the risks associated with construction, and the
control of operational costs, all of which would be reimbursed by the
collection of revenue from the public throughout the concession period. The
concessionaire would be granted

a specific concession

period, after which

time the project might be renewed at the option of the government, or title
would be transferred from the concessionaire to a government agency. It is
noted that the 195 km Suez Canal project, which opened for international
navigation on November 17th 1869, has a 99 year concession. Championed by
Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps, the Suez Canal company was empowered by
the Egyptian Government to build and operate the canal. They could fix and
levy transit dues at maximum defined rates.
The acronym “BOT” was first coined in the early eighties by Turkey’s Prime
Minister Targut Ozal (Augenblick and Custer, 1990), as a part of the
government’s effort to raise off-balance-sheet financing for its infrastructure
and industrial

projects.

Since then, it has become the

most prominent

innovation in international infrastructure projects.
In

developed

countries, BOT

telecommunications,

has

been

applied

to

power

generation,

sewage treatment plants, bridges, toll roads

and other

facilities. A typical BOT project, Anglo-French channel tunnel, the Eurotunnel,
built in the early 1990s, became the largest BOT project in the world.
In Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the oil rich countries of
the Middle East, BOT has been actively promoted for infrastructure development.
The cross-harbour tunnels in Hong Kong were the successful BOT projects in

6
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the past decades.
Developing countries need to embark on extensive infrastructure provision in
order to achieve and sustain economic growth and aspire towards the
standards of the developed economies. In their quest to achieve this objective,
developing countries have faced two major constraints: unavailable indigenous
technological know-how and financial resources. Traditional methods of project
do not fully alleviate these constraints. In an attempt to address the foregoing,
BOT scheme has been actively promoted by developing counties such as
Mainland China， Malaysia， and Philippines. As a consequence of the successful
experience, Thailand, Pakistan, India and Vietnam,

have also latched onto the

concept. These countries have been encouraged by multilateral organizations
like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, bilateral and donors， and
private sector finance institutions, all of which from the late 1980s have begun
to make more capital available for private infrastructure development and the
focus has been on BOT programs.

1.5 A Critical View of BOT in China
Deepening its economic reforms initiated

more

than 20 years, China (In

this thesis, China hereinafter referred to “Mainland China” ） has been
fastest growing

the

economy in the world. The tremendous economic growth

has resulted in an immense demand for infrastructure. However, the growth in
infrastructure sector has been relatively slow when compared with the
industrial

and

manufacturing

sectors. The

insufficient

telecommunication

provision, energy shortage, inadequate transportation network, obsolescent water
resources and distribution system etc. have created a bottleneck to its economic

7
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growth (Asian Development Bank, 1999).
The Chinese Government has been investing a large proportion of its budget
for infrastructure projects; however, it is far from enough for sustainable
development. In view of the government’s inability to provide sufficient
infrastructure service to meet the ever increasing demand, there are general
consensus emerging on a larger scale for private participants in infrastructure
provision

in

China.

Foreign

investors

especially

those

international

infrastructure entrepreneurs seeking business in developing countries are most
suited for this purpose. Those international firms bring along with them not
only their management expertise and technical skills, but also more importantly
their credit standing and ability to finance their investments. The best solutions
to the problems of infrastructure development in China should comprise the
elements

of

private

participation, commercial

principles, competition

and

innovations. BOT concept provides the solution which clicks all the above
elements together. Therefore, Chinese

Government

has been

attract foreign capital from various sources and channels

trying hard to

into the areas of

infrastructure projects using BOT approach.
Since Shajiao B thermal station in Guangdong Province, the first provincialapproved BOT project was implemented successfully in the early 1980’s, the
number of projects involving some forms of foreign investment had been
approaching one hundred. Although the characteristics of these projects suit the
basis of BOT concept, only five projects have been undertaken according to
the officially sanctioned BOT guidelines (China Statistical Bureau, 1999).
In 1996, Laibin B power plant in Guangxi Autonomous Region, the first stateapproved BOT project has become the model of future BOT projects in China.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In Laibin B, the bidding process and tender package won high marks from
international investors. Other major pilot BOT projects, ( e_g. a power plant in
Changsha, Puqi power plant in Hubei, a water treatment project in Chengdu
and Da Chang water project in Shanghai) have been sanctioned by the central
planning authority, the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC).
These pilot projects were planned, eventually to serve as models for expanded
programs in power, water treatment and transport areas.
The application of BOT in China is now being carried out stage by stage.
After some experience are gained through trial operations, the range of BOT
applications will be gradually expanded.

9

___________________________________________________Chapter 2: Justification for this study

Chapter 2: Justification for this Study
There have been several studies issued on BOT projects since the early 1980s.
These articles
projects by

tend to be addressed to the financial community of BOT
policy departments of organizations

such as the World Bank,

International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank and the European Bank.
Since late 1980, the wider issues associated with BOT approach were being
reviewed by such journals as
Economics,
Construction

Construction

the Euromoney, Construction Management and

Engineering

and

Management, the

Law Review and the International

International

Project Finance etc. These

research works focus on: of BOT projects classification (Walker and Smith,
1995); BOT development phases (Tiong, 1992a); the principal parties in a BOT
project and their interrelated contractual relationships (Keong et. al., 1997); and
evaluation the proposals for BOT projects (Tiong, 1995a). In recent years, there
is a growing body of literature addressing the issue of risk identification
(Donnelly, 1997; Nielsen, 1997; Tiong, 1995b) and risk management (Stijn,
1998) for BOT projects. Although the concept of BOT is popular in China,
there is limited literature in this area. Only a few articles focus on unique
risks ( Wang et al., 1999a; Macdonald, 1997) and risk management (Wang et
al., 1999b) associated with BOT projects in China.
For foreign
successfully

investors winning a BOT project

and operating the project

in China, the road is not easy. The whole process of project

development is a complex and expensive business. The financial risk is high,
competition is keen, negotiations are extensive, and opportunity costs are
considerable. Thus, the BOT promoters must calculate risks, take flexible
attitudes and stance. Proposals must be adaptable to changing circumstances

10
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and demands

by the

government.

There

are

some

factors

which

the

government gives special attention in phases of BOT projects. If the foreign
investors properly sustained and managed these factors, there would have a
significant impact on BOT projects. However, there has been lack of up-todate research on the critical successful factors (CSFs) in every phase with
BOT project, especially in China.
Therefore, it is important to identify and analyse the CSFs, and their relative
importance with BOT projects in China. This unique and critical information
has tremendous value to those foreign investors considering undertaking BOT
projects work in China.

2.1 Research Objectives
This research aims at enriching the knowledge and understanding of the CSFs
of BOT projects in China. In order to tackle the above issues, the detailed
objectives of the study are as follows:
-

To identify the CSFs associated with BOT projects in China;

•

To analyse the relative importance of these CSFs;

-

To explore a predictive model of CSFs with BOT projects in China.

2.2 Identification of CSFs Associated with BOT Projects in China
Within a business context, Rockart (1979) defined CSFs as “the limited
number of areas, the results of which, if they are satisfactory, will ensure
successful competitive performance for the organization. They are the few key
areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish.55 CSFs are
defined in this study as those characteristics when properly sustained and

11
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managed have a significant impact in a BOT project. The CSFs concept
should form the basis of a total approach by the investors to maximize their
chances of implementating a BOT project successfully.
The initial selection of these CSFs is judgmental and subjective as it is
determined by two sources. First, detailed studies to be done on those BOT
projects that are either under negotiation, under construction, or in operation.
The second source of observations is based on interviews of BOT project
promoters and government officials and their consultants.
In addition to these two sources just mentioned, the information of the CSFs
is also collected from the following sources:
-

Request for proposals issued by governments and proposals prepared by the
investors.

-

Annual reports, company and project profiles, and internal data made
available by the companies and government departments.

-

Articles in Newspapers and business magazines, information on internet,
journal papers, conference articles by professionals and government officials.

As the initial list of CSFs is long, it is necessary to minimize for evaluation.
Hence, only the CSFs associated with BOT projects in China are chosen for
study in this thesis. The validity of these CSFs will then verified through
questionnaire surveys and case studies.

2.3 Organization of this Thesis
This Chapter described the

research

objectives

of this

study and

the

identification of CSFs with BOT projects in China. The rest of the thesis is
organized

as follows: Chapter 3 reviews the previous literature on BOT.
12
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Chapter 4 focuses on provisional regulations on foreign investment BOT in
China. Chapter 5 covers the methodology employed. Chapter 6 takes up the
analysis and discussion of the survey results. Cases studies of BOT in China
are presented in Chapter 7. A predictive model of CSFs for BOT projects
implementation in China is proposed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 summarizes
important conclusions and provides recommendations.

13
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
Since late 1980s, several research studies have been published concerning
various aspects of BOT projects. These articles appeared in journals of the
Euromoney, Construction Management and Economics, Construction Engineering
and

Management, the

International

Construction

Law

Review

and

the

International Project Finance etc. The wider issues associated with BOT
construction management are being reviewed by the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization and a number of universities and polytechnics.
Another source of more detailed information of BOT projects are the
brochures of international construction company and legal

firms.

These

companies such as Price Waterhouse， Baker and McKenzie， and Kumagai Gumi
have studies of BOT projects which they are involved in. All of these
literatures provide invaluable information for this research study.
Due to the limitation of literature on the BOT, it is necessary to collect
information and to review previous literature on various aspects of BOT
approach for identification of the CSFs.
Tiong (1992a) summarized six phases of BOT. These six phases can be used
as models for the development of BOT. Tiong (1995a) concluded the criteria
of evaluation the proposals for BOT. The information of competitive proposals
can be acquired. Walker and Smith (1995) proposed a classification of BOT
projects. This classification based on the degree of complexity of the markets
and outputs. Keong et al. (1997) stated the principal parties and their
contractual relationships. He proposed a typical corporate structure for BOT.
Tiong (1995b) revealed that the risks are

most

tender. The limitation

not

of

this

study
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discussed market risk in BOT. However, he only analysed market risk of BOT
in developed countries. Nielsen (1997) concluded that there are three categories
of risks In BOT: the political risk, the financial risk and the technical risk.
Shen et al. (1996) emphasized the application of BOT in China. He identified
the areas for the practical application of BOT, including power plants, ports,
highways, railways and tunnels. Zhang (1996a) noted the development of BOT
in China from early phase in 1984 to 1995. Macdonald (1997) pointed out
that the risk of corruption will have negative effects on BOT. Wang et al.
(1998a) studied the case of Laibin B plant project which is a typical pilot
BOT project in China. Wang et al. (1999a) summarized the political risks of
BOT in China, emphasizing the risk of corruption, change in law, delay in
approved and expropriation. Wang et al. (1999b) proposed a risk management
framework for BOT in China. The process of this risk management model has
two

primary parts:

risk

identification and risk

mitigation;

followed by

confirmation that the risk mitigation measures are adequately implemented. It
provides step-by-step guidelines for project promoters who are keen to invest
in BOT projects in China.
Tiong and McCarthy (1991a) identified CSFs in winning BOT contracts. This
study qualitatively described the importance and characteristics of six CSFs
that are vital for project promoters in their endeavors to win BOT contracts.
These factors are: enterprenurship, picking the right project, a strong team of
stakeholders, an imaginative technical solution, a competitive financial proposal,
and inclusion of special features in the bid. Tiong (1996) proposed a useful
process model in tendering a BOT project He quantitatively analysed the
CSFs in winning BOT contracts which described by Tiong (1991a). Winning a
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BOT contract is only the first step in BOT project implementation. The
process from identifying of a suitable project, construction, operation to the
final transfer of the BOT project to the government may take a long period
of time. It is noted that each phase’s success determines the fate of the next
phase. For achieving a successful BOT project, foreign investors must pay
great attention to the CSFs in every phase.
The following sections will discuss several of these studies in details to
illuminate the development of BOT research during the past decade.

3.1 BOT Project Classification
According to Walker and Smith (1995), a classification of BOT projects was
proposed on basis of the degree of complexity of the markets they served and
the complexity of the outputs they produced.
The most straightforward group is the simple market/simple output category, in
which the market is normally a single buyer and the product is of a simple,
generic nature. A typical example is a BOT power station, providing electricity
on the basis of an agreed tariff to a single purchasing body. Other projects of
this type include telecommunications links (where the link is rented to a
national body for an agreed rent); waste reduction facilities such as

sewage

plants which process waste water on behalf

for an

agreed tariff. In these BOT

of local government

projects, factors of tax, foreign exchange and

tariffs are critical for the projects implementation successfully.
The second most common class of BOT projects is those which have
relatively simple outputs but rather more complex markets since they earn
their income on

a less easily defined customer base. Of these, the most
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common are private transport facilities such as toll crossings and toll roads.
These BOT projects have been encouraged by governments both as a means
of raising income for the provision of new infrastructure and as a means of
achieving private sector efficiencies. Other forms of transport infrastructure
may also fall into this group of projects, including urban rail and light rail
facilities.
There are a number of circumstances in which facilities providing relatively
complex product to single customer bodies through a contractual agreement.
Examples of such projects include the provision of maintenance facilities (e.g.
for defence equipment) and the provision of information systems facilities to
support public sector activities such as licensing or income tax processing. In
these projects, the key factor is the specification of the services required and
the quality of the outputs. These need to be specified in a manner which
allows flexibility in the volumes of individual outputs over time while
ensuring that the service provider is fairly remunerated for fixed and variable
costs of operation.
At the extreme point of this classification lies the projects which provide a
complex set of services to a complicated set of markets and which require the
construction and operation of major facilities. Airports, in particular, have
attracted a great deal of interest because of the very high capital costs and
the complexity of their construction. Governments have looked towards BOT
as a means of achieving private sector efficiencies and as a means of
accessing private sector finance for the heavy costs of construction. In view of
the complexity of the systems, price,

competition

and

the relationship

between the airport sponsor and any national or regional airline which may
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wish to use the airport as a hub for its operations are the key issues among
this type of projects.

3.2 BOT Development Phases
Tiong (1992a) identified and analysed six phases for the development of a
BOT project. These six phases can be identified in several BOT projects that
have been successfully implemented and can be used as models by project
sponsors in such ventures in future.
3.2.1

Phase One - Developing the First Proposal

Pre-investment studies

To

structure

project

and

implement a

project

based on BOT

concept， the

sponsors must adopt a different approach to business development.

Such initiatives should not of course be simply based on the identification of
a need for a capital project. The engineering, economic and financial feasibility
studies must be extensively carried out to determine the viability of the
project. A project scope should firstly be drafted and the probable technology
should meet the need identified. There is a need to establish enhanced
credibility for the BOT project at this stage because the project will have to
be financed in the private market without the traditional government repayment
guarantees. In putting a BOT project together, it is therefore essential that the
pre-investment

studies be as credible as

possible because ultimately the

financial market will judge the project on its own merits and not simply
because the government decrees that the project will be developed.
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Preliminary planning and negotiation

At this point, the project sponsor must verify, identify and establish the
reliability of the earning potential of the project and satisfy themselves in all
such aspects. At the same time, the project criteria should be established,
funding sources for debt and equity identified and preliminary contacts with
the government authority concerned made.
Preliminary terms and conditions

The preliminary terms and conditions for the proposal should be drafted to
include the following: length

of concession period, tariff rates, government

assistance and guarantees on foreign exchange, taxation etc.
The phase one process for a BOT project is summarized in Fig.3.1.

Fig. 3.1: Phase 1 - Developing the First Proposal

Source : Adapted from Tiong, R L.K. (1992a). “The Structuring of BOT Construction Projects”
Monograph Sericesof CACSt p.8. NTU, Singapore.
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3.2.2 Phase T w o -T h e Memorandum of Understanding
Having developed a proposal which is thoroughly researched within the
parameters suggested in phase one, the completed proposal is submitted to the
public

authority

concerned

for

appraisal.

If

the

proposal

meets

the

government5s criteria and the sponsors are shortlisted, the next stage will be to
go through

another hierarchy of approval with the government ministry

concerned. Another round of negotiations and revisions of the proposal might
be called upon. On approval of the proposal, a memorandum of understanding
will be issued to the project sponsor. This process is illustrated in Fig. 3.2.

AUTHORIZED THE
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Fig. 3.2 : Phase 2 - The Memorandum of Understanding

Source : Adapted from Tiong， R.L_K. (1992a) “The Structuring of BOT Construction Projects”
Monograph Series o f CACS, p.10. NTU, Singapore.
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3.2.3

Phase T h re e -th e Project Agreements and Organization

After the enactment of the necessary legislation and the award of the
concession， the project sponsor needs to proceed to establish a special purpose
project company. At this stage of the BOT project, all the contractual
agreements will have to be finalized with eveiy participant who is either
directly or indirectly involved in the project
Fig. 3.3 shows the contractual relationships among the major parties involved
with the project company.

Rg3.3:Hia3e 3 - The ftqject sgsecoais

Source : Adapted from Tiong, R.L.K. (1992a) *The Structuring of BOT Construction Projects'*
Monograph Series o f CACSt p.12. NTU, Singapore.
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3.2.4

Phase F our-T he Implementation Stage (BUILD)

The actual project implementation and execution will take place at this stage
and project finance is mobilized in constructing the proposed facility. The
most common method of procuring construction used by concession holders is
the use of turnkey, fixed price contracts. The contractor^ lump sum price will
not be allowed to fluctuate with inflation and the contractor has to be
responsible for risks such as unforeseen ground conditions. Another common
feature of BOT construction contracts is that there are considerable time for
bonuses and

penalties.

Because

BOT

projects

are

more

complex

than

traditionally organized construction projects, it is not unusual that independent
checking organizations are employed to ensure that the work is executed fairly
and correctly. There are often independent checkers for the design details, for
quality and cost controls and for management of the project.

This phase is

shown in Fig. 3.4.

Fig. 3.4: Phase 4 - The Implementation Stage

Source : Adapted from Tiong,R.L.K. (1992a) “The Structuring of BOT Construction Projects”
Monograph Series o f CACS, p.14. NTU, Singapore.
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3.2.5

Phase F iv e-th e Operation Stage (OPERATE)

As shown in Fig. 3.5, the Operator (usually a shareholder in the project
company) will take over the completed facility. During this stage, project loans
are expected to be repaid, taxes paid to the host government and dividends
declared to the shareholders of the project company.

Fig. 3.5: Phase 5 - The Operation Stage

Source : Adapted from Tion&R.L.KJ 1992a) “The Structuring of BOT Construction Projects”
Monograph Series o f CACSt p.l5.NTU, Singapore.
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3.2.6 Phase Six-R evert Facility Title (TRANSFER)
The ownership or title of the facility will be reverted to the government
authority after the specified
The final

three phases

concession

as evident

in

period
the

and

acronym

usually

at no

cost.

“BOT” are, Build-

Operate-Transfer.

3.3 A Typical Corporate Structure for BOT Projects
BOT projects have a typical corporate structure that is different from the
methods normally used to procure infrastructure assets. In

general, major

BOT projects involve at least the following parties: the client (which is
usually a government agency), project company, contractors, operators,

users,

suppliers, lenders, equity holders, insurers and consultants (Keong et al., 1997).
Schematic layout of the relationships of the principal parties to BOT projects
is illustrated in Fig. 3.6.

Fig. 3.6 : Relationships of the Principal Parties in BOT Projects
Source: Adapted from Keong ctal.(1997)4,Conditions for Successful Privately Initiated
Infrastructure Projects." Civil Engineering, Vol. 120, May, p.59-65, UK.
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For international projects, BOT schemes usually require the setting up of a
special-purpose project company in the host country, which is incorporated in
accordance with the laws of that country. The host government grants the
concession to this company to design, construct, finance, manage, operate and
maintain the asset throughout the concession period, and to transfer the project
to the government free of charge and in good condition at the end of the
concession period Thus, once the concession is formed, the concessionaire must
firstly

organize all the contractual agreement with other participant who is

either directly or indirectly involved in the project. For the project to succeed,
each of the parties involved must remain interconnected by the terms of the
required contracts and agreements. The details of the multiplicity of parties
and their

interrelated

contractual

relationships

in BOT

projects

are

in

Appendix.

3.4 Evaluation of Proposals for BOT Projects
Evaluation of tender proposals for privatized infrastructure projects that are let
under the BOT concept involves decision making by different government
officials from different departments and by their consultants. Choosing the best
proposal would depend on three elements: the quality of the definition on
specific criteria; the quality of evaluation on the available alternatives; and the
quality of the understanding of what these alternatives can produce. The
purpose of the evaluation and selection process is to identify what needs to
be done, to develop the specific criteria for its accomplishment, and to identify
the advantages, disadvantages and risks involved in each of the proposals
(Tiong, 1995a).
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The typical evaluation and selection process consists of pre-qualification of
interested promoters, evaluation of tender proposals, pre-award negotiations and
concession award. This process is commonly used by governments or their
agencies to serve 3 purposes:
■ to obtain the best deal for the public;
• to be fair to all competing promoters; and
-

to allow alternative proposals to be considered.

Competitive proposals should offer solutions to cope with many requirements
of government^ polices, as solicited proposals have to comply with the tender
guidelines and criteria as specified in the Request for Proposal (RFP).

3.5 Risks of BOT Projects
Considerable cooperation between the host government and private investors is
essential, since each of the project participants should take the risks they are
best suited commercially and are politically equipped to assume. The project
sponsors must evaluate and allocate the risks to the various parties involved.
3.5.1

Political Risks and Force Majeure Risks

The risk of government actions which may endanger a project. Actions can
occur at the central, provincial or local
political risks

government. More specifically, primary

include change in law, corruption, delay in approval

and

expropriation. Change in law risk includes changes in government policies
with respect to laws and regulations, methods to address inflation, currency
conversion, rates and methods of taxation, or the method by which electricity
tariffs

are set and approved. Macdonald (1997) found that corruption is

regarded by many companies as an unavoidable fact of life on projects in
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developing countries. This presents risks of spending either too much money
on corrupt officials, or spending money in the wrong places, or at the wrong
times—all at the risk of having a government agency turns against the project
developer and the project. Delay in approval risk means that the central or
local government authority does not approve the project related issues in time
or even cancels the already approved ones. Obtaining approvals for a project
from a complex web of government agencies and departments, from municipal
to provincial

to central

government

levels, can be

an

extremely

time-

consuming process (Tiong, 1995b). Expropriation risk is that the government
expropriates the project without giving reasonable compensation to the project
developer

and

investor

etc.

The

expropriation

can

take

the

form

of

nationalization of a facility wholesale or “creeping” expropriation whereby the
government changes regulations, taxes or tariffs after a project is complete to
gradually take over the facility and its operating profits.
Force majeure risk is one of the terms in the BOT project agreement. It
stipulates the circumstances beyond project developer’s or government’s control
such as natural disasters, war, hostilities, embargo, import or export restrictions.
The force majeure clause should be written into the concession agreement
(Wang et al., 1999a).
3.5.2 Financial Risks
Foreign exchange and interest rate fluctuations

Foreign exchange risk is especially relevant to the developing countries, which
have to import equipment and substantial amounts of materials using foreign
currencies for settlement. However, the income arising from the use of the
completed facilities or the sale of products are in local currency. Yet
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repayment of foreign loans has to be in foreign currencies. Therefore, project
sponsors usually have to seek remittance and convertibility guarantees from the
host government in order that the necessary transactions can be effected and
the project revenues including dividends can be remitted freely. Reluctance on
the part of govemmenis to give these guarantees or to curtail restrictions
inevitably discourages foreign investment in a country's infrastructure project.
Tiong (1988) suggested that an offshore “escrow account”， effectively a trust
fund established and funded by the proceeds generated from the venture, can
be set up to which all project revenues and foreign loans are paid. Such an
arrangement can avoid the risks of expropriation and ensure a smooth flow of
capital and revenues to all parties concerned during the concession period.
Foreign exchange fluctuations can also be detrimental to financial soundness
by affecting the prices of input and output, as well as loan repayment.
Likewise, an upward movement of interest rates will affect the repayment
ability of the project company. However, it is unusual for lenders to agree on
fixed exchange rates and interest rates in a lending package and, therefore,
other hedging facilities have to be sought.
Market risks

Changes in market price, demand and sources of raw material supply will
inevitably

affect

the

construction

and

operation

of

projects, let

alone

profitability. In industrial projects， lenders want to ensure the sale of the
product so that there are sufficient revenues to repay their loans. Suppliers
are, therefore, required to guarantee supply quantities and price and even to
secure the promise of alternative supply sources. The government, or more
usually, the wholesale purchasers, could guarantee their obligations by take-or-
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pay or take-and-pay agreements to purchase the product on defined terms and
price (Paul, 1997).
Income risks

For transport projects, the initial traffic forecast may be overoptimistic, either
due to wrong assumptions, or to the availability of alternative routes, or to an
insufficient connecting road network. Income from direct tolls may then fall
short of expectations and hence the cash flow of the sponsor is jeopardized
(Kumaraswamy, 1997).
Cost overrun risk

When construction costs exceed original estimates, either due to inflation or
excessive design changes, drawdowns from loans may not be able to match the
payments due to contractors. This may also cause lenders to question the
continued viability of the project (He, 1996).
3.5.3 Technical Risks
Construction difficulties

Unforeseen

soil

conditions

and

breakdown

of

equipment

are

common

occurrences on any construction site, especially for large civil engineering
projects. Usually, these will have repercussions on cost and time but the
effects are usually surmountable with today’s technology. Construction contracts
under BOT arrangement are usually of the Design and Build type, which do
not provide redress for contractors against adverse geological conditions.
Against the constraints of lump-sum fixed-price contracts, contractors normally
either include

a

substantial

risk allowance in the price or they simply

gamble and hope for the best (Westring, 1997).
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Completion delays

Projects can be delayed due to al shorts of reasons, but poor interface
coordination and late design changes are very common. Project sponsors need
to take positive steps against events like these. In particular they need to
ensure suitably designed and implemented organization structures, especially in
rer.pect of project management. They can also commit the contractors to lump
sum contracts, using proven technology and agreed milestone schedules, which
define contractually the timing and relationship of critical ctages of the
projects with payment incentives. Less positive measures include the imposition
of heavy liquidated damages based on expected loss. Contractors could also be
required to provide completion guarantees and performance bonds. In the latter
case, the risk of cost increases due to late completion is borne by insurance
companies or banks, for which a premium is charged (Barrett, 1986).
Operation risks

During operation of the facilities the revenues generating capability may be
hindered by equipment breakdown or the discovery of defects in the work.
Proper training of local operators for operation and maintenance is obviously
essential, as

is

the

stipulation

of

adequate

contractual

provisions

for

maintenance and the making good of defects by the contractor. Maintenance
bonds will also provide a source of funds for the remedial work. More
positive

steps

include

careful

choice

of

operator, and

where

possible

involvement of the operator in the design and commissioning phases. The
sponsor must ensure that the operator has adequately provided for management
of the operation and maintenance of the completed facilities over the entire
concession period (Neal, 1988a).
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3.6 Risk Management
The task of risk management and structuring in BOT projects is a very
complex process which requires all parties involved to remain committed to
the goal of successful project implementation and the project company acting
as the hub of the scrutiny and security package (Wang, 1999a; Stijn, 1998).
The interest of all parties have to be taken into consideration. Wang et al.
(1999b) proposed a risk management framework for BOT in China. This risk
management framework is applicable and practical. In this model, guarantees
and contractual agreements are the predominant techniques used to distribute
risk in BOT project.
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Chapter 4 Current Regulations on Foreign Investment BOT Projects in
China
To encourage foreign investors to make investment in Chinese infrastructure
projects and to standardize the operation of foreign investment BOT projects,
Provisional Regulations were formulated by the

State Development and

Planning Commission (SDPC) in 1996 (http://www.chinalaw.com).

4.1 Practical Definition of BOT in China
“BOT projects” as used in these Provisional Regulations should refer to the
infrastructure projects built， operated and transferred by foreign investors. A
government authority may, through a franchise agreement and within

a

specified period, authorize a BOT project to a project company established by
a foreign investor particularly for such BOT project, and have the project
company responsible for its financing, construction, operation and maintenance.
After the expiration of the franchise period, the project company had to
transfer the entire facilities to the government authority in good condition and
without any claim. Within the franchise period, the project company should
operate lawfully and independently, and recover and obtain returns on its
investment through payments received from users of the facilities.
The form of the project company should be a limited liability company. The
registered capital should not be less than 25% of its total investment. The
project company should be entitled to the ownership and management rights
of such facilities during the franchise period. In principle, the franchise period
should not exceed 30 years.
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4.2 Range of Application of BOT in China
“BOT projects” as used in these Provisional Regulations should include: coalfired

power

stations

and

hydro-power

stations

under

250MW

(giving

consideration to flood control and water supply), high grade roads, local
railways, bridges, tunnels, city water supply sources, water purification plants and
sewage treatment plants. BOT project should be included in the State and
local five-year plans. The above range of BOT projects may, on the basis of
specific conditions, be subject to expansion.

4.3 Approval and Establishment Formalities
The feasibility study report of a BOT project should be proposed by the
planning authority of the province (or autonomous region or municipality) in
which the project is located and the competent authority in charge of such
BOT projects, and should upon initial examination and approval of the industry
management authority, be

submitted to

the

SDPC

for examination

and

approval. In the case of very large projects, the approval of the State Council
is required after the initial examination and approval of the SDPC. The
government authorities empowered to authorize BOT projects include: the
industry management authority under the State Council, and the People’s
Governments in provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the
central government and cities listed separately in State planning. The BOT
agreement should be entered into by the representative authorized by one of
the above government authorities.
The foreign investor of a BOT project should be selected through the method
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of international competitive bidding. The standing agent for BOT projects
established

by

the

SDPC

should

be

responsible

for

the

organization,

coordination and other related matters of the project.
Upon obtaining

approval

for

a

BOT

project, the

government

authority

authorized to issue such BOT project should start to prepare the preliminary
qualification evaluation and bidding documents and submit such documents to
SDPC for examination. The procedures of developing BOT projects in China

Figure 4: Procedures of Developing BOT Projects in China

Source: Adapted from Shen, L., Lee, K.H. and Zhang, Z. (1996). ^Application of BOT
System for Infrastructure Projects in China.'' Journal o f Construction
Engineering and Management, ASCE, Vol. 122, No. 4, p.319-323.
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4.4 Major Contents of the Concession Agreement
The BOT agreement should be concluded in accordance with the following
procedures: government authorities should submit the outcome of the bid
evaluation and the BOT agreement ( with the feasibility study report of the
bidder’s project attached thereto) to the SDPC for examination and approval.
The BOT agreement should at least include the following contents:
-

The names, places of residence and representatives of the legal persons of
the relevant parties of the BOT agreement;

-

The content and term of the BOT;

-

Project design, construction, operation and maintenance standards;

-

The schedule and extension of the project, and the outcome of termination;

-

The construction price of the project and the billing plan;

-

The criteria and procedure for handing the project over to the Government
after the expiration of the term of the BOT;

-

The rights and responsibilities of the governmental authorities;

-

The rights and responsibilities of the BOT project company;

-

The risk-sharing principle; and

-

The transfer of the rights and responsibilities of the project company
subscribed by the BOT agreement.

The investor approved to win the bid should establish the BOT project
company in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of China. The
authority empowered by the Government should execute the BOT agreement
with the representative

of the BOT project company. The BOT agreement

should become effective as of the date of the execution.
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The SDPC should carry out franchise registration for all BOT project
agreements concluded pursuant to the provisions herein. The registered BOT
agreement should be protected by the laws and regulations of the State.

4.5 Procedures of Bid Invitation, Submission and Evaluation for BOT
Projects
4.5.1 Procedures of Bid Invitation, Submission and Evaluation
A preliminary qualification evaluation should be conducted of foreign investors
intending to submit bids before publishing bidding documents.
The application for tenders should include at least the following items:
-

Feasibility study report of the BOT project;

■ Proposed schedule of the construction of the project;
-

Proposed billing standards and adjustment formula;

-

Bid bond;

-

Other items required by the bidding documents.

The feasibility study report of the project should include at least the following
items:
■ Survey of the project and target;
-

Assessment of the effects of the project on the environment;

-

Market demand for the project, as well as its costs and charges;

-

Description of

project

engineering

and

technical

index,

including

the technology to be adopted;
•

Description of the project company, including engineering, construction
and operation plans;
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-

Financial

analysis, including

total

investment,

cost

of

labor

and

materials, financing scheme and cost, cash flow, internal rate of return,
inflation rate, supposed foreign exchange rate and interest rate, analysis of
risks and sensitivity and other items included in the feasibility study report.
The letter inviting qualification assessment or bidding announcement should be
published in at least two national newspapers. Upon a bid opening, the tender
can not be changed, and should be in conformity with the terms, form and
requirements of the tender documents. Any incomplete and unregulated tender
or any tender which has material conflict with the tender documents should be
refused. The bidder should guarantee that the contents of its bid have been
independently raised and that it should not consult with other bidders for
bidding collusion in order to gain the priority of unfair competition. All the
bids submitted on time should be publicly opened in accordance with the date
and site subscribed by the invitation for bidding, as well as in accordance with
standardized procedure. All bidders are allowed to take part in the opening of
the bids.
4.5.2 New Tendering Law in China
To further regulate the project procurement and administration activities, and to
minimize related corruption, the

Chinese Government began drafting the

national Tendering Law in 1994, which was formally promulgated on August
30, 1999.

As the first

state-level

law related

to tendering, the national

Tendering law is one of the milestone laws in China that will help shift
China’s

economic

system

from

a

planned

(http://www.chinalaw.com).
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Features o f new Tendering Law

(a) The tendering process is, for the first time, made a compulsory requirement
for the awarding of infrastructure projects, projects related to public interest
and security， projects financed/invested partially or wholly by the government
and/or by foreign banks, organizations/govemments.
(b) Two tendering methods of open competitive tendering and selective
competitive tendering are clearly defined. For open competitive tendering,
the Invitation to Bid (IoB) should be advertised on public media inviting
all those interested to apply for pre-qualifications (if applicable) and/or
bidding for the project. For selective competitive tendering， the IoB should
be sent to only those selected potential bidders. All state or local key
projects should be allocated through the open competitive tendering, except
for those that are not suitable for open competitive tendering, such as
military projects. For the latter type of projects, the selective competitive
tendering

can

then

be

adopted subject to the approval obtained in

advance from the SDPC or provisional planning authorities.
(c) An open, fair and equal tendering procedures and all detailed requirements
for each step are established. For example, project clients have to obtain
approval before issuing IoB, which has to state clearly the amount and
source of project finance，pre-qualification of bidders，project’s technical and
economic requirements, evaluation criteria of tenders, timing of key events,
etc. The evaluation committee has to consist of at least two-third of
technical and financial experts who have to meet specified requirements.
The successful tenderer has to finish the project in accordance with the
contract signed and can not sublet the key parts of project to subcontractors.
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(d) All projects adopted BOT scheme must be bid. From the end of 1996,
BOT project would be awarded to foreign developer only after open
competitive tendering, while previously it was awarded through direct
negotiations. In addition, the Chinese Government strongly encourages local
key contractors to form joint ventures with foreign contractors to bid for
any kind of international and local projects. The Government is due to
issue details on the related incentives.
Roles o f tendering agencies

It is the first time the

tenderingagency concept is

introduced in the

Tendering Law in China. According to the Tendering Law, a project client can
decide whether to organize the tendering process by himself or to commission
to a registered tendering agency. It also prohibits any

persons, including

government officers, to assign or recommend tendering agencies to the project
clients. By this

way, it is hoped that corruption in the

project procurement

process could be minimized.
According to the Tendering Law, a tendering agency is a formally registered
agency company providing agent services for project clients of any types of
projects. Although it has not been clearly stated in the Tendering Law that
foreign companies are allowed to set up tendering agencies in China, there is
a great possibility for foreign companies to do so. This was implied in the
government’s declaration on September 7, 1999, that China would expand the
agency services market for foreigners by following the international custom
and practice. Also, the possibility is indicated by developments in the real
estate sector, where foreign companies are allowed to set up real estate agency
in China after the promulgation of the Real Estate Law.
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China's unique culture and social system make the project procurement
practice

different

from

western

countries.

Only

those

who

have

fully

understood the system can survive and succeed in bidding for projects in
China.
4.6 Liability and Risks
The State guarantees the exchange and transfer to foreign countries of the
foreign exchange necessary to repay the principal and interest of loans and to
pay the project company's dividends. Except in case where the existing BOT
project is unable to satisfy

market

demands, the governmental

authorities

should not approve any new competitive projects. Government authorities are
entitled to

conduct

company’s operational

supervision, examination

and auditing

activities. The governmental

of the project

authorities

should not

provide any form of guarantee regarding the rate of return of the project
investment. The domestic financial institutions and non-financial institutions
should not provide any form of guarantee for project financing. The project
company should pay taxes in accordance with the provisions of State laws and
regulations on the taxation of foreign investment enterprises, and are entitled to
relevant preferential treatment tax reductions and exemptions. The project
company should be responsible for the training of the personnel required to
assume independent responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the
project after the transfer of the project. After the expiration of the term of
BOT agreement, the project company should, without reservation, hand over the
technology and data of the operation and maintenance of the project to the
government authorities without any compensation. The project company should
share commercial risks such as project financing, construction, operation and
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maintenance.

丁hrough

methods such as adjustment of the billing standards and

the extension of the BOT term, the government authorities should also share
the risks of the BOT project due to material effects resulting from changes in
State policy.

4.7 Applicable Law and the Settlement of Disputes
The BOT agreement’s execution，performance， and interpretation， as well as the
settlement of its disputes, should be in accordance with the laws of China. In
issues not yet regulated by the laws of China, international convention should
prevail.
All disputes arising during the performance of the BOT agreement or having
connection with the

above agreement should

be settled

through friendly

consultation between the parties to the agreement. If a settlement could not be
reached through consultation， such disputes may be submitted to a Chinese
arbitral body or other arbitral bodies for arbitration.

4.8 Government Policies to Attract BOT Investment
4.8.1 Taxation
BOT projects involving foreign investment can enjoy preferential treatment of
taxation, according to an official with the administrative Department of
Foreign-Funded

Projects

under

the

State

Administration

of

Taxation

(http://www.chinalaw.com).
The preferential treatment of taxation on foreign-fUnded enterprises undertaking
BOT projects are included in the following three aspects:
- To pay enterprise income tax at a rate of 15 percent;
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-

Starting from the profit-making year, foreign-funded enterprises in BOT
projects can enjoy tax exemption for two years and 50 percent reduction
of enterprise income tax for three years. For some specific projects, they
can enjoy tax-free treatment for five years and 50 percent reduction of
enterprise income tax for another five years;

_

Foreign-funded enterprises undertaking BOT projects with operation period
shorter than the depreciation period of fixed assets set by the state
Taxation Laws can accelerate the depreciation during the operation period
with approval from related department.

4.8.2 Foreign Exchange
When a country’s economy is market-oriented and becomes international, its
currency will be accepted by other countries for free circulation and settlement
of international payment, and the currency becomes wholly convertible. The
long-term goal of China9s reform on foreign exchange is to achieve the free
convertibility of RMB to foreign currencies. The short-term goal is to put the
currency of the nation^ current account into conditionally convertible in the
near future.

However, the present condition for immediate convertibility of

RMB of the state’s current account is still immature as the reform on banking
structural mechanism is still in progress. China has not yet acquired a full
capacity for international liquidation and payment. It is expected that the
reform

of the

exchange

system

undoubtedly

has

created

a

favorable

environment for foreign investors to develop infrastructure projects in China
through the BOT

system.

On the

other

hand, Chinese Government

has

recognized the impact of the convertibility problem on foreign investors, and
designed several alternative methods for foreign investors to exchange RMB
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for foreign currencies. The alternative ways endorsed by the government for
converting investors5 RMB revenues to foreign currencies include balancing
between two projects and engaging import and export business.
4.8.3 Other Favorable Conditions
Foreign investors engaging infrastructure projects in China through the BOT
method can also enjoy other preferential treatments that have been practiced on
other countries (Shen et al., 1996). The significant preferential treatments include
the following:
Price adjustment

Since both the construction and operation of the infrastructure projects entail
long time periods, it is permitted to adjust the prices for equipment, materials
and labour during the construction period, and to adjust the service prices in
operation period according to the national price index, so that the investors can
avoid the risk of inflation.
Property development rights

Infrastructure facilities usually offer meager profit opportunities. Investors can
not purely rely on operating the project alone to get enough revenue to
repatriate their costs. Therefore, the government usually gives the property
development rights to the infrastructure investors for them to make profits and
improve

their

incomes. For

example, the

rights

for

developing

certain

commercial real estate such as shopping mall, hotels, and office buildings in
certain areas can be given to investors engaging in transportation, ports,
airports, and subway projects.
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology
The data collected for this research study were analysed by both quantitative
and qualitative approaches. The rationale for using this integrated techniques
is to provide a more complete picture of a phenomenon. In respect of the
quantitative methodology, statistical analysis of the survey data can cast new
light on field work research. Concurrently, survey findings can illuminate field
work that was previously inexplicable or misinterpreted. It also affords the
means of demonstrating the generality of in-depth interviews. Jarratt (1996)
stated that qualitative techniques strengthen data analysis not only through
providing insights into constructs for quantitative assessment, but also in
drawing conclusions from the quantitative data and making recommendations
to decision makers. Therefore, a combination of methods for an integrative
quantitative and qualitative research methodology was employed in this research
study.
The methodology developed for this study involve three stages. In the first
stage, a comprehensive literature review together with documented experiences,
unstructured interviews with professionals, and lessons learned from successful
BOT projects were aimed to identify critical success factors (CSFs) associated
with BOT projects in China. A survey via questionnaires from BOT project
companies and government authorities to evaluate the importance of these
CSFs was conducted in the second stage. In addition to the mail survey,
constructive interviews for in-depth discussion were conducted to confirm
responses and explore some issues in more detail. In the third stage, case
studies of three BOT projects

in China

were made in order to confirm

the validity of the survey^ findings, as well as to propose a predictive model
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of CSFs for investing in future BOT projects in China.
During the primaiy stage, literature was reviewed firstly for all CSFs associated
with BOT projects. (World Bank, 1998; Lam, 1997; AES, 1996; B&M, 1996a;
PFI, 1996a; Tiong, 1988, 1990a-c, 1991a-b, 1992a-b, 1995a-c, 1996, 1997a-c). The
BOT projects in China were also referred to. For example, Shajiao B Power
thermal station (Macdonald, 1997; B & M, 1996b; Hopewell Holdings Co., 1988),
Laibin B Project power plant (Wang et al, 1998a, 1998c; PFI, 1996a-f; Bridge
of Trust Co. Ltd., 1996; Guangxi Government, 1995). Yan^n Second Tunnel
(Zhang et al, 1998; Zhang, 1996a-b), Da Chang Water Plant in Shanghai (Chew,
1997; PFI, 1997a), Changsha Power Plant in Hunan Province (PFI, 1997b-d),
Tangshan Power Plant in Hubei Province (PFI, 1996d) etc. About fifty factors
placed in six basic phases for BOT projects implementation were identified. As
the initial list of factors was quite lengthy, it was necessary to reduce it for
evaluation. Therefore, only CSFs associated with BOT projects in China were
chosen for study in this thesis.
The filtration of CSFs was carried out mainly based on seminar with
professors and experts. The author's experiences and case studies together with
unstructured interviews and discussions with BOT project sponsors, developers,
lenders, contractors, government officials and their consultants were also used.
At last, the final list of CSFs was selected, and a comprehensive questionnaire
for a survey was subsequently designed.

5.1 Quantitative Data Analysis
The sample

In China, a BOT project should have been proposed and initially approved by
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the planning authority of the province (or autonomous region or municipality)
in which the project is located. Thus, a list of BOT projects was finally
obtained by the competent authority. Although a number of projects were only
sanctioned by local government, foreign investors still regard them as BOT
projects.
The application of BOT mechanisms is still rather new in China, there are
only eighty-one BOT projects in China at present (Interviews, 1999). In view
of the small population of BOT projects, the sample for this research was
drawn from all BOT project companies in China as well as

provincial

authorities who are administering the concerned projects. Since all the BOT
projects need to have close cooperation between investors and various
government departments, a competitive investor must have a clear understanding
of the importance that governments attach to the CSFs. Therefore, it is important
that the local government authorities in which BOT projects are located should
be chosen for participating this survey. By virtue of their participation in this
survey, they can reflect the governmental views on the CSFs.
The instrument

A questionnaire was chosen as the research instrument because it is the
only method being capable of reaching respondents scattered around China. It
is an inexpensive survey method compared with the personal interviews and
the telephone methods, which would have made the research on this scale.
Pretesting

Before conducting the field work research, a pretest was carried out to refine
the data collection plans and to test the questionnaire and interview guide with
respect to both data quality and procedure. The test results
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knowledge on the issues that covered by the questionnaire and helped the
researcher to clarify terms and language used. Therefore, a pretest was
conducted by sending questionnaires to

several companies

for checking

whether there were any problems such as ambiguity of statements or improper
wording. This pretest took a two week period to complete during early
December 1998. Several questions were later revised as a result of the
exercise.
Operational measures

The structured questionnaire was used to provide comparable response data for
quantitative analyses of CSFs associated with BOT projects in China. It
focused on six basic phases that BOT projects must go through: preliminary
qualification evaluation, tendering phase, concession award phase, construction
phase, operation phase and transfer phase. The first part of the questionnaire
was designed to obtain information about background of the project. The
second part contained questions about CSFs associated with six phases for
BOT projects.

The last part of questionnaire

was aimed at

obtaining

information of other CSFs and suggestion for future BOT projects. The
covering letter was designed to contain most of the necessary elements as
suggested by Churchill (1991). The letter stressed the importance of the study
to the general society, to the respondent and to the researcher. Anonymity and
confidentiality were also emphasized in this letter. The questionnaire was
written in Chinese, and all respondents received this Chinese version. The
reason for using questionnaire in Chinese is to avoid misinterpretation of the
questions, as it would entail problems and misrepresentation later during the
data analysis stage.
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The CSFs in the questionnaire were itemized in rating scale. In the survey,
the respondents were asked to rank the factors in accordance with a scale of
criticality. The scale is as follows: 4 = extremely critical; 3 = critical; 2 = fairly
critical; 1 = not critical; NA = no opinion. By virtue of this five-point rating
scale the respondents would find it more easier to answer the questions.
Furthermore the questionnaire provided space for any commentary made
their business

situations.

on

Such survey method would also facilitate the

researcher to record the data.
Questionnaire administration

The administration of the survey was assisted by the Information Department
of the State Statistical Bureau in collecting questionnaires and arranging the
discussions

and

respondents

of

interviews with
BOT

project

selective professionals.

company

are

upper

To

level

ensure

the

managers, the

questionnaires were sent to managing directors at the head office. Senior
administration officers at the authority of the local governments in which the
projects located and the competent authority in charge of such BOT projects
were

also

chosen

as

the respondents.

Following the

mailing

questionnaires, telephone calls, faxes and e-mails were made to

of

the

respondents to

get their assistance on completing the questionnaire and taking part in personal
interview.
During the three month period, after the first mailing of questionnaire, a total
of 24 valid questionnaires were received from project companies with an
overall response rate of 29.6%. A total of 28 questionnaires from the authority
of local

governments were also received with an overall response rate of

34.6%. Particulars of the respondents from BOT project companies are shown
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in Table 5.
T a b le 5 P a r tic u la r s o f th e R e sp o n d e n ts fro m B O T P r o je c t C o m p a n ie s

Respondents’ Particulars

Number of Respondents

Percentage of Respondents

by resp on d en ts5 project category

Power plant

10

41.7%

Highway

8

33.3%

Railway

2

8.3%

Port

1

4.2%

Water conservancy

3

12.5%

24

Total

100%

by resp on d en ts’ d esign ation

(Vice-) Managing Director

6

25%

(Vice-) President/General
Manager

4

16.7%

Project Manager

14

58.3%

Total

24

100%

by resp on d en ts, ex p erien ce

With BOT experience
Internationally

20

83.3%

With business experience in
China

24

100%

With BOT experience in
China

10

41.7%
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Data Analysis

To find the differences and similarities of the views on importance of the
CSFs, a comparison between managers from BOT project company (hereinafter
referred to as “foreign investors”） and officers from government (hereinafter
referred to as “government officials’’)， referred in this study as Group 1 and
Group 2 respectively was designed. Analyses were conducted by using SPSS
for Windows. The One-Way ANOVA data analysis technique was employed.

5.2 In-Depth Personal Interview
The use of the in-depth interview was aimed at asking interviewee open
questions without having to conform to a rigid structure. It provided an
opportunity to gather more detailed data to supplement that obtained from the
mail survey. Relevant company documentation and internal data made available
by the project companies and the government departments were also sought at
the end of the interviews. It aimed to deal with problems of establishing the
construct validity and reliability of a qualitative study (Yin, 1989). It also
allowed the researcher to address a broader range of historical attitudinal and
observational issues. The constructive

interviews

for

in-depth discussions

were undertaken in April 1999. All respondents were selected for in-depth
personal interviews. Each interviewee was asked to express his views relating
to BOT project. The average interview took 30 minutes to complete, with a
range of one hour for the longest interview and 20 minutes for the shortest
one. Information gathered through the in-depth interview was helpful and
constructive.
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5.3 Three Case Studies
Since case study can provide more detailed information to supplement that
obtained from the mail survey, it is therefore meaningful to study the CSFs in
details associated with BOT projects in China from practical examples.
According to the interviews with top managers and study of company
documents, three cases were studied on basis of the CSFs referred to in the
survey. The influences of the CSFs on these cases were also analysed.
Based on the findings of the survey and case studies, a predictive model of
CSFs for BOT projects implementation in China is proposed.
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The survey results on the importance of critical success factors (CSFs) placed
in six phases associated with BOT projects in China are discussed in this
chapter. The development of a BOT project may go through six phases. These
phases

are:

preliminary

qualification

evaluation

phase, tendering

phase,

concession award phase, construction phase, operation phase and transfer phase.
Each phased success determines the fate of the next phase. For a successful
BOT project, foreign investors must pay attention to the CSFs in every phase.
The CSFs associated with BOT projects in China are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 Critical Success Factors with BOT Projects in China

Critical Success Factors

Phases of BOT Project
Preliminary qualification
evaluation phase

Appropriate project identification
Stable political and economic situation
Favorable legislation and regulations
The capability of project promoter
Experience with BOT project by promoter
Lack of funds for infrastructure projects

Tendering phase

Competitive tendering system
Attractive financial package
Acceptable toll/tarifF levels
Technical solution advantage
Select suitable project agencies

Concession award phase

Concrete and precise concession agreement
Reasonable risk allocation
Special guarantees by the government
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency insurance

Construction phase

Quality control and supervision
Select suitable subcontractor
Standardization of engineering contract
A multidisciplinary and multinational team
Good relationship with government authorities

Operation phase

Management control
Training local staff
Sound environmental impact
Public safety

Transfer phase

Technology transfer
Operation in good condition
Overhauling guarantees
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6.1 CSFs in Preliminary Qualification Evaluation Phase
A preliminary qualification evaluation should be conducted by the foreign
investors who are intending to submit bids. The application for investors
should include the feasibility study report of the project. The engineering,
economic and financial feasibility studies must be extensively carried out to
determine the viability of the project. A project scope should be drafted and
the probable technology should meet the need identified. At this stage, it is
necessary to establish credibility for the BOT project because it will have to
be financed in the private market without the traditional government repayment
guarantees. CSFs in preliminary qualification evaluation phase are as follows:
Appropriate project identification
One of the crucial factors in winning BOT contracts is to identify and choose
the right project to initiate as in the case of unsolicited proposals, or to
compete as in the case of competitive tenders. Governments

in several

countries include China have openly declared BOT as the main means of
privatizing public services and have

drawn up a long list of projects for

foreign investors to undertake. Foreign investors must be cautious in selecting
the right project to prepare the proposal. A number of basic conditions that
should apply in order to

maximize

the

chances

of the

project being

demonstrably commercial (Tiong, 1996).
(a) Accurate prediction of need
There should be a demonstrated and accepted need for the project in China.
For tolled facilities, the demonstrated

need is the critical traffic congestion,

especially at peak hours, and there

is no other alternative to relieve the
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congestion except by building another road or bridge. For utility projects such
as power plant or water supply project, the demonstrated need is the acute
shortage of electricity or water to meet the domestic or industrial demands.
The accepted need is that the government is aware of the problem and
seriously attempting to solve it. In some projects, the government may have
already initiated feasibility studies on new routes or alignments.
(b) Potential to achieve near-monopoly
There should be a near-monopoly situation in the provision of the service or
product. Bridges or tunnels without competition from alternative crossings are
usually more viable commercially than roads with significant traffic diversion
(Anderson, 1989).
(c) Reasonable cost
Foreign investors will naturally be most interested in those projects which
have the greatest potential to be “commercially” profitable. They will invest in
a project if they are reasonably certain that they can recoup their investment,
as well as making an adequate profit, whether the investment is recouped
through road-tolls, electricity sales or other tariffs. The cost of the project
should be reasonably within what foreign investors can afford.
Stable political and economic situation
A successful application of BOT concept requires the presence of certain
background environment. The political will and economic situation of the host
government to support the project are important (Tiong, 1991a).
(a.) Political environment
A stable and supportive political climate is a pre-condition for BOT project.
Host government needs to demonstrate clearly their privatization
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BOT projects to take place in the country.
As part of their effort to attract foreign investment into infrastructure sector,
Chinese Government has repeatedly demonstrated their intention to adopt BOT
contracts in infrastructure investments. China is politically ready for BOT
today. In fact, the strategy of Chinese

economic reforms started off

by

consolidating the political controls to ensure the stability for economic growth,
(b) Economic environment
Since the economic reform started in 1978, China has become the world’s
fastest growing economy. The rapid economic expansion has created the
largest infrastructure market in the country. The increase in economic activity
has generated， and will continue to do so， a heavy demand for infrastructure
for at least the next 10 years.
Favorable legislation and regulations
A typical BOT project involves complicated structure of contract which
requires a reliable legal framework in the host country. The inherent risks are
greatly reduced if enabling legislation or precedents exist in the country. Since
1979, the Chinese Government promulgated various laws and regulations on
foreign investment related matters (http://www.chinalaw.com).
(a) The Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
In BOT project, the project company shall be a wholly foreign-owned
enterprise governed by the Law of China on Wholly Foreign，owned Enterprises
adopted at

the

sixth

National

According to the Law on
shall

People’s

Congress

on April

12, 1986.

Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, the State

not nationalize or expropriate wholly foreign-owned enterprises except

for special circumstances.
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(b) Contract Law
All economic contracts concluded between enterprises with foreign investment
and foreign enterprises and other economic organizations or individuals are
governed by the Law of China on Foreign Economic Contracts promulgated
in

March, 1985. This

Law

respects

the

international treaties to which

China is a contracting party or a signatory. Where
provisions

such

treaties

contain

provided different from the law of China, the provisions of the

international treaties prevail.
( c ) Intellectual Property Protection
People’s Republic of China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization
on March 3, 1980. In accordance with the bilateral agreements or international
treaties to which a foreign investor’s host country is a member, foreigners and
foreign investors may apply to the relevant authorities of

China for patent

technology or trade marks registrations, or enjoy copyright as their computer
software is published so as to have their patent, trade mark and software
copyright protected in China.
The Income Tax Law, the Land Administration Law, the Security Law, the
Labor Law, the Environmental Protection Law, the Insurance Law and the
Arbitration Law, the Financial

Affairs and Accounting System for Foreign

Invested Enterprises, Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control etc. are all
applicable laws and regulations for BOT project company. On the other hand,
various incentives are in place for carrying out BOT infrastructure project in
China.
imported

These policies

include

equipment, longer

corporate

tax

holiday, tax exemption

for

concession period, price adjustment right and

property development rights in projects etc. All these are meant to promoter
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the viability of the projects. However, BOT is still rather a new mechanism in
China and it is unavailable to have some aspects not fully covered by the
existing legal framework. The existing laws and pertinent regulations need to
be further modified in order to implement the more effective application of
BOT.
The Capacity o f project promoter
Strong capacity

should

exist

within the

project

promoter

to

win

the

concession.
(a) Perseverance and financial strength
In addition to the technical skills, the promoter must be able to persevere and
must consist of members who are financially sound so that they are able to
bear and share the huge development costs. To have perseverance and holding
power, the following professional and personal characteristics are essential in a
strong team: acceptance of a common goal; capacity for analysis of countryrelated parameters such as political risk and government commitment; effective
negotiating strategy; financial strength to bear the development

costs;

the

will to persist against all odds; and submerging of potential conflicts of
interests among the different parties.
(b) Entrepreneurship
For

BOT

projects, entrepreneurship

can

be defined

as the

pursuit

of

opportunities beyond the financial and technical resources that the entrepreneur
currently

possesses. The

project

promoter

must

posses

entrepreneurial spirit and the desire to take the lead
business or penetrating a new market.
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(c) Leadership from key entrepreneur
An entrepreneur must have the support of the board of directors and should be
authorized to have access to other in-house divisions so that the team has a
key project champion that the government can identify with. This is also the
person who is responsible for cultivating goodwill with the government. His
functions are on the front-line negotiations (Tiong, 1997a).
Experience with BOT project by promoter
Foreign promoters with solid technical backgrounds and related experiences in
undertaking BOT projects are crucial ingredients for success.
Lack o f funds for infrastructure
The urgent need coupled with the lack of funds by Chinese Government in
pursuing the much needed infrastructure will caiase the government to be more
receptive to the BOT projects. If the Ministry of Finance or Central Bank has
adequate fimds or foreign exchange reserves, chances are that the local public
works authority concerned may
privatization

not

be too

keen

in accelerating the

of the public projects (Tiong, 1996).

6.2 CSFs in Tendering Phase
In tendering phase, foreign investors should develop a proposal which is
thoroughly researched within the parameters suggested in phase one, the
completed proposal to be submitted to the public authority concerned. If the
proposal meets the govemmenfs criteria, the next stage will be to go through
another hierarchy of approval with the government ministry concerned. Another
round of negotiations and revisions of the proposal might be called upon.
CSFs in tendering phase are as follows:
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Competitive tendering system
Many

difficulties

and problems

exist

in

the

process

of developing the

competitive tendering system in Chinese infrastructure project. The major
outstanding problem is partial competition. The analyses in chapter 4 have
demonstrated the significant development of applying a competitive tendering
approach in Chinese infrastructure projects. However, this approach has not yet
been

fully

established.

As

many

small

or

medium-sized

state-owned

companies have no competitive strength, government departments must assign
them certain projects so that these companies will survive. On the other hand,
foreign investors or foreign-participating joint ventures are restricted to certain
kinds of projects (Shen et al., 1996). The partial competition practice not only
affects the effectiveness of using infrastructure investment, but also puts the
tendering process in a negative light.

The possibility of corruption among

government officials responsible for project procurements or assignments is
high.
Attractive financial package
The financing package should be carefully tailored to the characteristics of the
project. Under

the

BOT

model,

it

is

the

commercial

and

financial

considerations, rather than the technical elements, that are likely to be the final
determinants in winning the BOT concession. An attractive financial package
must be based on the principles of low capital cost, low operation and
maintenance cost, credibility, minimal financial risks to the government, and
minimal burden on debt-servicing capability of project revenues. These can
be

achieved

through

maximizing

long

term

project

debt, maximizing

fixed-rate financing at low interest rates, and minimizing re-financing risk.
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Other aspects
minimization

in

a

financial

of interest expenses

package that
during

need

construction

consideration are
and

accounting

requirement. A BOT investor^ ability to arrange an innovative, flexible, and
attractive financial

package

seems to be the crucial element behind its

success in winning BOT projects.
Acceptable toll / tarijf levels
The tariff level is keenly scrutinized by the government during the selection
process. Frequently, a project will operate in some form of monopoly and thus
the government, for political reasons, will have to regulate the tariff to ensure
that it is justifiable. Tariffs need to be reasonable from the point of view of
consumers so that they are not burdensome, as well as from the point of view
of the investors and lenders, so that the revenues are adequate to compensate
them. Balancing these conflicting interests is a very delicate task. In coming
up with an acceptable toll/tarifF level, the foreign investors must study carefully
the traffic-volume forecasts, one of the most difficult and yet important factor
to be considered. The project tariff and revenues, and thereby success of the
whole proposal, could hinge on the accuracy of the forecast.
Technology solution advantage
An imaginative technical solution is also a critical factor in winning the
tender for a BOT project. The element of an innovative design must provide
a simple and cost-effective solution by using proven technology to meet the
needs of the project. This will create the competitive advantage against other
proposals and make the proposal highly attractive to the government.
Select suitable project agencies
To expedite the decision -making process, the local
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project is located will usually commission a specific BOT project agency. The
agent will represent the local government in the implementation of the project
on a BOT basis. The scope of work will include the initial planning,
preliminary financial feasibility study, pre-qualification, tendering, evaluation and
negotiation and dealing with other relevant matters (Bridge of Trust Co. Ltd.,
1996).
Being a bridge linking overseas investors and Chinese Government, such
organization could assume multiple roles such as a project agent, sponsor and
consultant. Currently, there are three such agents in China. They are the
Bridge of Trust Co. Ltd. (“Bridge of Trust”)， the agent for Laibin B; the
Beijing BOT Investment and Development Co. Ltd (“Beijing BOT”)， the agent
for the Beijing-Tongxian expressway and the BOT International Project
Development Co. Ltd. (“BOT International”)， the agent for the Wangcheng
power plant in the city of Changsha in Hunan province, which is the second
BOT project approved by the SDPC. These agents are all government-backed
and have been given special privileges. For example, the Bridge of Trust is
jointly

owned

by the

SDPC together

with the

Chinese

Ministries

of

Construction, Trade and Electric Power. Hence, it has strong influence at the
central government level. It has also close liaison with the European Union
companies and European export credit agencies. These agents usually charge
the local government about 0.5% agent fee. For example, Bridge of Trust
earned about US$3.5 million by acting for the Guangxi Government in the
Laibin B project.
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6.3 CSFs in Concession Award Phase
After the enactment of the necessary legislation and the award of the concession,
the project sponsor will proceed to establish

a

special purpose project

company. At this phase of the BOT project, all the contractual agreements
will

have to be finalized with every participant who is either directly or

indirectly involved in the project. CSFs in concession award phase are as
follow:
Concrete and precise concession agreement
Most of the researchers have concluded that a good concession agreement is
an essential success factor and can avoid a great deal of trouble and conflict
in future operations (Li, 1999). A good agreement must be drafted in clear
terms and conditions that can be easily understood by all partners as well as
the working staff, and each partner's authority and responsibility in the project
must be clearly understood.
Basically, a BOT project should be established on basis of the mutual trust
and understanding, but the agreement must be more concrete and precise
regarding liability. Other important factor that need to be included in an
agreement is accounting standard. Accounting administration is very important
in every kind of alliances. Profit or loss should be distributed according to
the respective shareholding. Once the distribution of profit/loss is agreed upon,
conflict associated with profit/loss distribution will be minimal.
Reasonable risk-sharing
Project risks include all factors or eventualities which can not be definitively
predicted and incorporated into the project costing. The larger and more
complex the project, the greater the risks. Because BOT projects are typically
62

Chapter 6: Findings & Discussions

financed primarily on a limited or non-recourse basis with the cash

flow

generated by the project and the project assets constituting the principal
project security, project promoter in BOT projects have become particularly
sensitive to the need to identify and allocate project risks at a very early
stage of the development of the projects. In BOT projects, typical risks include
unforeseen engineering problems, cost and time overruns, currency exchange
variations, project repatriation, unreliable market and demand projections, and
environmental and social costs etc. Efficient allocation risks has been critical
in marking

a project financeable. Contractual

agreements, guarantees and

exercise assignments are the predominant techniques used to distribute risk in
BOT projects.
Special guarantees by the government
The obvious problems and risks associated with BOT projects in China can be
substantially

reduced

if

sufficient

supports

are

provided

by

the

host

government. The special guarantees by the government are useful to enhance
the finance ability and viability of BOT projects in China. In the pilot BOT
project in China, special guarantees will be obtained: (a) adopt BOT scheme
using international custom and practice to develop much-needed infrastructure;
(b) foreign promoter will be awarded contracts only after an open competitive
tender process; (c) the foreign investors will be able to own 100 percent right
of the operating company; (d) successful tenders will have to finance their
projects from a revenue stream based on letters of comfort from the
government; (e) ofF-take agreements are provided instead of the guaranteed
returns that have characterized many projects in China; and (f) the foreignexchange assurance.
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Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ( ftMIGA,f) insurance
MIGA is established at 1989 by World Banking Group, which provided
guarantee for the overseas investment in respect to the non-commercial risk in
the host country. China is one of the founder of the MIGA. The application
of the MIGA guarantee by the foreign investors of which can reduce the unexpectable risk.
In cases where a government agency moves ahead with an action such as
expropriating project assets, “political insurance” can be a useful resort.
Political insurance is offered by the MIGA. MIGA policies offer coverage
against: wars and civil disturbances; expropriation;

breach of contract by a

government

directly

agency;

currency

transfer

problems

resulting

from

government actions or policy changes. In each case, MIGA insurance pays the
net book value of the insured investment， and premiums are significantly lower
than similar policies obtained through private insurance firms. To qualify for
MIGA insurance, a project must be from a member country. Further, the
project to be insured and must be evaluated by MIGA as financially,
economically and environmentally sound, and must also be judged to contribute
positively to the host country’s development needs. Finally, the host country
itself must approve the insurance application, declaring up front that it will
comply with the project contract terms.

6.4 CSFs in Construction Phase
The actual project implementation and execution will take place at this stage
and project finance is mobilized in constructing the proposed facility. CSFs in
construction phase are as follows:
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Quality control and supervision
Quality or the performance standard of the services are often specified in the
concession agreement to ensure that the public users’ benefit are protested. If
the under-performance persist, the government may revoke the concession.
Therefore, quality control and supervision system is very important in BOT
projects. Normally, a BOT project to be effective, would require two levels of
checking. Firstly, the relevant statutory body or the independent

checker

established for this specific purpose. Secondly, the internal quality assurance
committee within the project company, including the appointed consultants.
Effective quality control and supervision procedure, experiences, and consistency
are essential ingredients in quality control system.
Select suitable subcontractor
Subcontractor selection for a BOT project is critical because it directly affects
the outcome of the project. Essentially, the project company should analyze the
various attributes of the potential subcontractor and

choose one that can

complement them most in terms of needs. The project companies usually
search for subcontractor who have compatible objectives, are experienced in
BOT projects, specialize in technical skills with suitable management styles, and
are trust worthy

and financially credible. In addition to financial

aspects,

management competence and complementary skills are also essential ingredients
of prospective subcontractor.
Standardization o f engineering contract
The

engineering

contract

is

an

extremelyimportant

instrument

in

a

construction project. It is a legal definition of liability and responsibility
between the client and

contractor. In addition, it is also an instrument
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for allocating risk and profit.

Different developers would prefer different

contract conditions. The BOT project contractor should enter into the kind of
contract that is familiar to avoid uncertainties of a project. Engineering
contracts were originally drafted in a precise, legal language that would remain
unequivocal even when subjected to detailed and hostile scrutiny by astute
legal minds. However, as revisions were incorporated, the language become
more complicated. In certain cases, the number of words in each sentence
grew to a level beyond the understanding of the average reader. Bunni (1986)
estimated that these sentences can only be easily and readily understood by
4% of the population (equivalent to an intelligence quotient of 130 and over).
Adopting current international construction contracts that are familiar to most
contractors is one way for a better understanding of the contract conditions
and clauses. These contract conditions are considered relatively fair by both
contractor and client. Standard contract forms issued by professional and trade
bodies are recommended, such as the Institution of Civil Engineers Contracts
and the International Federation of Consulting Engineers contract (FIDIC). In
China, FIDIC

contract

conditions

are

accepted

by

most

investors

and

contractors.
A Multidisciplinary and multinational team
It is very important that the foreign investor strengthened its positions in
construction phase by 'forming a multinational team in BOT project. A strong
partnership, proper combination of diverse skills and talents are essential to
study the multifaceted requirements of a project. The team must consist of
highly qualified professionals from reputable companies and with the requisite
technical

and

engineering

skills

including financial
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sub-contractors and suppliers. They must be able to exhibit suppleness in
relations. This is the period when uncertainties abound and the different
partners are learning to adapt to each other9s cultures, languages, characteristics,
and abilities. All

the key

participants must therefore exhibit

the

right

attitude to attain a strong and stable partnership that is able to survive the
many moments of crisis ahead (Pierce 1989).
It is the best to bring local contractors and a Chinese investment corporation
into the group. In China，“guanxi” or special relationship is still very popular
in construction marketing. Local contractors, especially those having good
contacts with officials of construction department are very important. To
encourage local investment corporation involvement in the construction of BOT
projects has also the benefit to minimize the foreign cash requirements.
Good relationship with government authorities
Cultivating goodwill with the host government is particularly critical in China.
The BOT concept is new to the government. Foreign investors must cultivate
goodwill with the host government by earning their trust and respect through
patience and understanding of the governments’ positions. They can then
slowly educate the government about the essential characteristics of the BOT
concept and develop a long-term relationship with them through successive
BOT projects. Establishing a good relationship with the host government
authorities, such as environmental authorities, can help to alleviate hostile
attitudes and to collect usefUl information for marketing.

6,5 CSFs in Operation Phase
In operation

phase， the

operation

and maintenance operator ( usually
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shareholder in the project company) will take over the completed facility.
During this stage, project loans are expected to be repaid, taxes repaid to the
host government and dividends declared to the shareholders

of the

project

company. CSFs in operation phase are as follows:
Management control
The factor of management control would be essential for a

successful

operation of the facility. Without active management control by the foreign
investors, there is no real transfer of advanced foreign management technology
or efficiency improvements in facility operation. The management of these
multi-faceted activities, the inherent difficulties and inevitable conflicts in such
projects is becoming prominent issue in the success and well-being of the
BOT projects. Contemporary network planning techniques and computer-based
project management systems should be used in the BOT projects. In order to
survive under the competitive global market, the trend is towards flatten
organization structure so that quick response to market changes can be made.
As such, empowerment is the approach adopted by Western companies.
However, employee^ maturity level has to be high before empowerment can
be implemented effectively. In China, where empolyees, maturity has to be
worked on first, a more authoritative style of management will be appropriate.
With regard to BOT projects in C h in ' management control includes control
over management

decisions

pertaining to

the

project, and the

financial

structure, to control over procurement and contracts related to facility etc.
The project company may choose to manage and operate the facility itself, or
it may opt to use an operation contract. Professional firms are employed
sometimes which focus on taking on operation and maintenance (O&M)
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management responsibilities in order to optimize the operational efficiency of
invested facilities.
Training local staff
Rapid

transfer

of

management

knowhow

and

operation

skills

requires

significant commitment to training. The project company shall be responsible
for the training of the personnel required to assume independent responsibility
for the operation and maintenance of the project after the transfer of the
project. The high volume of information for technology advancements in
highly competitive projects is leading to slow absorption. The BOT model is
primarily geared towards facilitating investments in large scale projects by
foreign and multinational corporations. They can afford more systematic and
specialized

training

programs

more

frequently

than

smaller

national

competitors. Though such training is likely to be most critical at a general or
line management level， it frequently extends to the factory floor—particularly in
high technology sectors. Dunning (1993) concluded that training may take
different forms. It may be formal or informal: knowledge may be transmitted
by the printed word, lectures and seminars, formal or informal consultations,
quality-control circles, intra-firm visits and inspections, example and experience.
It may be focused on the improvement of professional and technical skills or
on motivation of workers.
Sound environmental impact
Foreign investors investing within the territory of China shall follow the laws
and related regulations of China concerning environmental protection. Projects
which

may

cause

serious

pollution

shall

be

restricted. Requirements

for environmental protection of the BOT projects shall include: prevention and
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control of flue gas and smoke dust pollution; prevention and control of waste
water

pollution;

prevention and control of

noise; and greenery in the

plant area. The project company shall submit an environmental impact report
pursuant to the standards provided and the current situation.
Public safety
Maintaining

good

relationships

with the

local

population

is critical

for

maintaining a stable implementation of BOT project. Compliance with local
culture and tradition is the best measure to win trust and receive friendly
treatment from the local population. Apart from business and profit, the project
company should consider making contributions at the same time, such as
providing

assistance

to

local

community

development

and

practising

environmental protection. All these can help build up one’s business status and
win the respect of local people.
In China, it is necessary to employ logistics agents, security firms, and
pollution control specialists. The project company must set up a security
department which reports to the local police branch.

6.6 CSFs in Transfer Phase
In this phase, the ownership or title of the facility will be reverted to the
government authority after the specified concession period and usually at no
cost. CSFs in transfer phase are as follows:
Technology transfer
A significant trend in BOT projects has been the requirement for transfer of
technology

through

concessionaire.

丁he

during the transfer phase is critical.
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increasingly focused on management science, distinct operation means and
methods, and ultimate project production technology. These soft technology
must be transferred and used to improve efficiency and accountability on the
financial side of BOT projects.
Operation in good condition
On expiration of the concession period, the project company

shall

transfer

the project according to the schedule. Facilities shall be well maintained and
in good operating condition. All drawings, information materials, reports, records
and testing instruments must be complete and in good working order.
Overhauling guarantees
The project company shall conduct overhaul and maintenance of the facilities
according to the agreed schedule, shall abide by the appropriate practices and
fix overhaul and maintenance intervals in accordance vsdth suggestions of the
manufacturers. The project company shall arrange a final overhaul for the
facilities before expiration of the concession agreement. The time and content
of final overhaul shall be approved by local government.

6.7 Finding
6.7.1

&

Discussion

Preliminary Qualification Phase

The CSFs in preliminary qualification evaluation phase listed in

Table 6.1

were respectively ranked from 1 to 6 on the basis of the mean scores by
foreign investors and government officials.
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Table 6.1 Comparing the Views of Government Officials versus Foreign
Investors on Importance of CSFs (One-way anova test)
Preliminary Qualification Evaluation Phase

Critical Success
Factors

Group 1: Foreign Investors Group 2: Government officials
( N = 24 )
( N = 28 )
Mean

S.D.

Rank

Mean

S.D.

Rank

SIG.

Appropriate project
identification

3.40

.81

1

3.42

.78

1

.939

Stable political and
economic situation

3.27

.87

2

3.25

.85

2

.944

Favorable legislation
and regulations

3.17

.79

3

3.05

.72

5

.574

The capability of
project promoter

3.14

.66

4

3.13

.85

3

.820

Experience with
BOT project by
promoter

3.10

1.05

5

2.92

.83

6

.482

Lack of funds for
infrastructure
project

2.89

1.07

6

3.08

.88

4

.490

Notes: S.D. = Standard Deviation

SIG. = Significance

* denotes significance at P < 0.05
According to the survey results on foreign investors, five of the six listed
CSFs are regarded as important, because five of their mean scores are greater
than the rating score 3 (The scale is as follows: 4 = extremely critical; 3 =
critical; 2 = fairly critical; 1 = not critical; NA = no opinion). The CSF with the
least mean score, lack of funds for infrastructure, is still deemed as important
for its mean score is close to 3 (critical). Appropriate project identification
has a mean score of 3.4 and is considered the most critical of all the six
factors in the preliminary qualification evaluation phase. The scores for the
stable political and economic situation, favorable legislation and regulations,
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the capacity

of project promoter and experience with BOT project by

promoter are quite close, signifying these factors are of equal importance.
For government officials, all the factors are also regarded as critical. The order
of criticality of the CSFs from the government officials are : (1) appropriate
project identification, (2) stable political and economic situation, (3) the
capability of project promoter, (4) lack of funds for infrastructure project, (5)
favorable legislation and regulations, (6) experience with BOT project by
promoter.
It can be seen from the Table 6.1 that the agreement on the ranking of the
CSFs are on the factors of appropriate identification and stable political and
economic situation. The ranking on the factors of the capability of project
promoter and experience with BOT project by promoter are close. Both
government officials and foreign investors chose the CSF of appropriate
project identification as the most important CSF in preliminary qualification
evaluation phase. These show that foreign investors and government officials
do support the CSFs in this phase. Despite the differences in the mean scores,
there are no significant differences between foreign investors and government
officials in respect of the CSFs in preliminary qualification evaluation phase
according to the statistical results.
There is concurrence of views between government officials and foreign
investors regarding the

importance

of the

CSFs

of appropriate

project

identification, the stable political and economic situation. They are especially
important at preliminary qualification evaluation stage. As appropriate project
identification and stable political and economic situation enable
promoters not to

foreign

waste their precious resources from the beginning and
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to compete in the appropriate project that has the “strategic fit” with the
environment. For example, while such assumptions seemed perfectly valid at
the time when the projects were prepared their validity in the wake of the
Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the stagnation of the China economy, is in
question. As a result, it is necessary to carefully re-examine the project and the
assumptions they are based on, taking into account the updated economic
information. The capability of project promoter is also critical as it provides
the credibility for the promoter to be invited by government to tender.
Therefore， there is positive agreement between government officials and foreign
investors on the importance of these CSFs in preliminary qualification
evaluation phase.
6.7.2 Tendering Phase
Table 6.2 shows that for foreign investors, the CSFs of competitive tendering
system and attractive financial package are critical because their mean scores
are greater or equal to the rating score 3 (critical). Competitive

tendering

system has the highest mean score of 3.21, which is considered the most
critical factor. The other factors are critical with their mean scores being close
to 3.
For government officials, the mean scores of all the factors are greater than
2.46, approach critical. The order of importance of the CSFs in tendering
phase are: (1) competitive tendering system, (2) attractive financial package, (3)
acceptable toll/tariff level, (4) technical solution advantage, (5) select suitable
project agencies.
It can be seen from the table 6.2 that the agreement on ranking of the CSFs
in tendering phase. The CSFs of competitive tendering system, attractive
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financial

package

and

acceptable

toll/tariff levels

are

regarded

as

the

most important. For both parties, the ranking of attractive financial package is
higher than technical solution advantage. It is second versus fourth. This was
confirmed by Tiong (1995c), which compared the impact of financial package
and technical solution in winning BOT concession. The CSFs in tendering
phase are supported by foreign investors and government officials.
Table 6.2 Comparing the Views of Government Officials versus Foreign
Investors on Importance of CSFs (One-way anova test)
Tendering Phase
Critical Success
Factors

Group 1: Foreign Investors
( N = 24 )

Group 2: Government officials
( N = 28 )

Mean

S.D.

Rank

Mean

S.D.

Rank

SIG.

Competitive tendering
system

3.21

■82

1

3.04

.95

1

.501

Attractive financial
package

3.0

.85

2

2.96

.71

2

.121

Acceptable toll/tariff
levels

2.97

.81

3

2.96

.81

3

.97

Technical solution
Advantage

2.93

1.03

4

2.65

1.00

4

.923

Select suitable
project agencies

2.83

•87

5

2.46

.78

5

.106

Notes: S.D. = Standard Deviation

SIG. = Significance

* denotes significance at p < 0.05
There is positive agreement between foreign investors and government officials
on importance of the CSFs in tendering phase. They chose the factors that
would contribute most to the success of the projects, and they believe that the
CSFs

of competitive

tendering

system, attractive

financial

package

and

acceptable toll/tariff levels are the most important. In China, the introduction of
competitive bidding for a project is a new development that will help to
provide sound commercial incentives to project developers to build projects
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quickly and efficiently and also to operate them

efficiently.

Enhanced

performance will lead to enhanced retiims to the foreign investors. Under the
BOT model, the commercial and financial considerations are rather important
than the technical elements. The government adopted a lower weighting for
the technical proposal because the tender document already specified that
international technical specifications and standards will be used for the project
and lenders (banks) are surely more concerned with the technical feasibility of
the project and will certainly examine more carefully the promoter's technical
proposal. It

is the financial package that provides the cost advantage that

differentiates it from other competing proposals. The high priority set on a
low tariff is due to the fact that China is still a developing country, and the
government has to protect its people from too high toll/tarifF levels. Therefore,
attractive financial package and acceptable toll/tariff levels are likely to be the
final determinants in winning the BOT concession.
It is interesting to note that the CSF of select suitable project agencies is
regarded as of lesser importance by the foreign investors and the government
officials, eventhough the specific BOT project agencies have been given special
privileges. To foreign investors, once the financial package and technical
solution are accepted by Chinese Government, the other CSFs should fall in
place quite easily. To the government officials, the proposal with the attractive
financial package and technical solution

advantage is more important than

select suitable project agencies, as the CSF of select suitable project agencies
should be the prerogatives of the promoters themselves. On the other hand, a
specific BOT project agency plays an important role only in pilot BOT
projects.
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These pilot BOT projects were defined by the central government BOT
guidelines and promoted by the SDPC. The key distinguishing feature of the
pilot

BOT model is the use of competitive tender of the concession to a

wholly foreign owned entity on the basis of the lowest final price to the
customer. However, Local governments do not like the transparent and
mechanical process of competitive bids. Instead, they like the discretionary
nature of negotiated tenders. This explains why there is an uniform view in
this CSF for both parties.
6.7.3 Concession Award Phase
As shown in Table 6.3, for foreign investors, the first and the second factors
are critical. The mean score of the other factors are close to 3, and could
basically be deemed as critical. The factor of concrete and precise concession
agreement has a mean score of 3.20 and is thehighest as compared with
other factors in concession award phase. The next

most critical is reasonable

risk allocation. Special guarantees by the government and MIGA insurance are
regarded as of least importance.
For

government

officials, all

the

CSFs

in

concession

award

phase are

considered close or fairly close to critical. The order of importance of the
CSFs are:

(1) reasonable

government, (3)

concrete

risk allocation, (2) special
and

precise

concession

guarantees by the

agreement, (4)

MIGA

insurance.
It can be seen from Table 6.3 that the ranking for the CSF of reasonable
risk allocation is close, is in second place by foreign investors versus first by
government officials.
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Table 6.3 Comparing the Views of Government Officials versus Foreign
Investors on Importance of CSFs (One-way anova test)
Concession Award Phase
Group 1:1foreign Investors
rN = m
Mean
Rank
S.D.

Critical Success
Factors

Group 2: Governmeiat officials
nsj =
Mean
S.D.
Rank

SIG.

Concrete and precise
Concession agreement

3.20

.92

1

2.96

.86

3

.329

Reasonable risk
allocation

3,17

.79

2

3.13

.80

1

.849

Special guarantees by
the government

2.87

.82

3

3.13

.85

2

.263

MIGA insurance

2.82

.98

4

2.73

.77

4

.714

Notes: S.D. = Standard Deviation
* denotes significance at p<0.05

SIG. = Significance

There is no significant difference between foreign investors and government
officials in respect of the CSFs in concession award phase according to the
statistical results. From foreign investors and government officials5 views,
reasonable

risk

allocation

is critical.

During this

phase, the

concession

agreement is awarded and signed, and there will invariably be extensive
negotiations

on

the

project

credit

structure

and

the

securing

package.

Governments often want to pass more risks to the promoter than the promoter
can handle. It is therefore essential for foreign investors to understand the
importance of the factor of reasonable risk allocation. One of the strategies for
reducing the risks of BOT projects is that of

government guarantees. China

has been guaranteeing a specific rate of return on projects, but the World
Bank has tried to convince China that this approach benefits neither the
consumer (country) nor
if the

promoter of

the
a

foreign

power

investors. For example, in

plant is
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bettering an agreed maximum price under a power-purchase agreement, there
is reason to get the job done quickly at the lowest possible cost and operate
the plant efficiently. Both sides should be better off Hence, the project
companies should look primarily to the revenues from the project itself. There
is positive agreement between government officials and foreign investors on
the importance of the CSFs in concession award phase.
6.7.4 Construction Phase
For foreign investors, Table 6.4 shows that almost all factors in construction
phase are critical. Quality control and supervision has the highest mean score
of 3.59, and is the most critical as compared with other CSFs. The next most
critical factor is to select suitable subcontractor. The CSF of standardization of
engineering contract is also important because its mean score is greater than 3
(critical). The factors of a multidisciplinary and multinational team and good
relationship with government authorities are regarded as of lesser important.
For government officials, the mean scores of the CSFs are greater than 2.63.
This shows that the CSFs in construction phase are all fairly critical from the
government officials9 view. The order of importance of the CSFs are: (1)
quality

control

and

supervision, (2)

select

suitable

subcontractor, (3)

standardization of engineering contract, (4) good relationship with government
authorities, (5) a multidisciplinary and multinational team.
As shown in Table 6.4, the agreements on ranking of the CSFs are quality
control and supervision, select suitable subcontractor and standardization of
engineering contract. The ranking for the CSF of a multidisciplinary and
multinational

team

is

close, being fourth by foreign investors versus fifth

by government officials. For the CSF of good relationship with government
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authorities, the

ranking

is

fifth

by

foreign

investors

versus

fourth

by

government officials. There are significant differences found between foreign
investors and government officials in respect to the CSFs “quality control and
supervision” and “select suitable subcontractor” （p <0.05). The significant
differences are explained as follows.
Table 6.4 Comparing the Views of Government Officials versus Foreign
Investors on Importance of CSFs: (One-way anova test)
Construction Phase
Critical Success
Factors

Group 1: Foreign Investors
( N = 24 )
Mean
S.D.
Rank

Group 2: Government officials
( N = 28 )
Mean
S.D.
Rank

SIG.

Quality control and
supervision

3.59

•57

1

3.21

.72

1

.038*

Select suitable
subcontractor

3.55

.63

2

3.02

.90

2

.002*

Standardization of
engineering contract

3.20

.92

3

2.96

.86

3

.329

A multidisciplinary
and multinational
team

2.83

.97

4

2.63

.92

5

.442

Good relationship
with government
authorities

2.66

1.04

5

2.79

.93

4

.621

Notes: S.D. = Standard Deviation
* denotes significance at p < 0.05

SIG.= Significance

Construction phase is the most critical phase as greatest risk developed during
this phase. Significant portions of project cost are poured in during this phase.
Government officials and foreign investors are in agreement on the ranking of
the CSFs of quality control and supervision, select suitable subcontractor and
standardization of engineering contract. They are especially critical in the
construction phase. The significant difference on the CSF of quality control
and supervision may be because the government has different set of interests,
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as compared to foreign investors, which are more social and political driven
than profit driven. From government view, a BOT project should be designed
and built to higher standards than traditional project. This coupled with
adoption of quality assurance and supervision system and the interesting roles
of BOT projects, encourage greater cooperation and a less adversarial approach
to problem-solving. However, the primary goal and interest of foreign investors
in a BOT project is naturally to ensure an adequate return on their investment
before the end of the concession period. For foreign investors, there is little
incentive to ensure that the facility remains financially or technically viable
after it has been transferred to the government* Maintenance and capital
replacement costs are likely to be kept at a minimum. Therefore, in order to
speed up the project and to procure a fixed construction cost, turnkey contracts
with fixed lump sum price are often used in BOT projects. Under a turnkey
contract, the contractor is responsible for the design and construction of the
project based on outline design and performance specifications. The contractor
has an incentive to maximize his profit and minimize the construction cost by
delivering the minimum quality of construction for the agreed prices (Paul,
1997). The arrangement that the design and construction to be done by
contractor make possible technically for a marginal quality to be provided.
And it is contractually acceptable so long as the project complied with the
minimum standard of performance

required

at the time of commissioning.

Interior quality or latent defects, if any, not appeared during the contractual
period will be left as problems to the local government. Otherwise, project
companies

are

ultimately

only

accountable
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dividends should be maximized. The objectives, strategies, plans and operations
of project companies are often not disclosed for reasons of “commercial
confidentiality”. Lack of accountability and responsibility is exacerbated in
China where the legal framework Judicial system and regulatory authorities are
weak. Foreign investors, in particular, will feel little need to be accountable to
local people unless they are forced to be. This will increase the difficulties
for the government supervision in some extent.
The significant difference on the CSF of select suitable subcontractor may be
because the main contractors for the project are often also the principal
promoter of the project and they tend to select subcontractors from the team
themselves. In contrast, the government hope that local subcontractors are
chosen to join in the project. The Chinese Government side inevitably wants
to maintain control over construction through its local enterprises. By taking
on construction contracts, the local government can supply work to its
affiliated enterprises, while simultaneously maintaining control over this critical
stage of the project life cycle. However, Chinese construction quality is
generally regarded as poor. Foreign investors often try to avoid dealing with
Chinese subcontractors. They want to select an internationally reputable and
experienced

subcontractor

to

take overall

responsibility with a wrap on

construction contracts, or a financially sound foreign sponsor to take on
responsibility for construction risks.
6.7.5 Operation Phase
For foreign investors, Table 6.5 shows that almost all factors are critical.
Management control is the most important factor than other factors.
local

staff and

sound environmental impact
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importance. The CSF with the least mean score, public safety, is still deemed
as critical for its mean score is close to 3 (critical).
For government officials, the mean scores of all the factors are greater than
2.72, approaching critical. The order of importance of the CSFs in the
operation phase

are: (1) management control, (2) training local staff, (3)

sound environmental impact， and (4) public safety.
It can be seen from the Table 6.5 regarding the agreement on ranking of the
CSFs in the operation phase. This shows that these CSFs are supported by
foreign investors and government officials. There are no significant differences
between foreign investors and government officials in respect of the CSFs in
operation phase.
Table 6.5 Comparing the Views of Government Officials versus Foreign
Investors on Importance of CSFs (One-way anova test)
________________Operation Phase___________________
Critical Success
Factors

Group 1: Foreign Investors
(N = 24)
Rank
1

Group 2: Government officials
( N = 28 )

Management control

Mean
3.41

S.D.
.73

Training local staff

3.07

■87

2

2.83

Sound environmental
Impact

2.77

.77

3

Public safety

2.55

•87

4

Mean
3.33

S.D.
.82

Rank
1

SIG.
.707

.92

2

.343

2.80

.67

3

.160

2.72

.72

4

.546

Notes: S.D. = Standard Deviation;

SIG. = Significance

* denotes significance at p < 0.05
In the operation phase, a key success factor is collaboration to test the
workability, efficiency, and
Therefore, management
management

know-how

manageability

of

the

full-scale

deployment.

control is more important. Lack of technical and
to

operate

the
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facility,

and

lack

of

skilled
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and trained

maintenance staff are common phenomena in China. Hence,

training local staff is also important. Sound environmental impact and public
safety are also critical in the operation phase for BOT projects in China.
Making adequate profit out of the proceeds coming from the operation and
commercial exploitation of the project for foreign investors is a primary goal
in the operation phase. For foreign investors’ view, it is better for permanent
ownership and the largest extent of commercial freedom. However, public
authorities

often

prefer

shorter

concession

duration

and

smaller

scale

commercial freedom, once the decision has been made by the government to
relinquish a degree of control over a defined concession period
6.7.6 Transfer Phase
Since very few major BOT projects have successfully completed all stages of
the cycle ( build - operate - transfer ) at the time of the research, analysis of
results for this study is only exploratory

and it needs time to verify.

Likewise, the mean scores of CSFs for foreign investors and government
officials in the transfer phase are relatively lower. Consequently, these factors
are just fairly critical. For foreign investors, technology transfer has a mean
score of 2.97 and it is considered the most critical in transfer phase. The
mean score of overhauling guarantees is 2.53, is the lowest score among all
CSFs in the transfer phase. This may be due to the fact that almost all
respondents have no practical experience of transfer stage.
For government officials, the mean scores of all the factors are greater than
2.88, approaching critical. The order of importance of the CSFs are: (1)
technology transfer, (2) operation

in good condition, and
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guarantees. There is general agreement on the ranking of the CSFs

in the

transfer phase. This shows that these CSFs are supported by the foreign
investors and governments officials. There are no significant
between foreign investors and

differences

government officials in respect of the CSFs in

the transfer phase.
Table 6.6 Comparing the Views of Government Officials versus Foreign
Investors on Importance of CSFs (One-way anova test)
Transfer Phase
Critical Success
Factors

Group 1: Foreign Investors
( N = 24 )

Group 2: Government officials
( N = 28 )

Mean

S.D.

Rank

Mean

S.D.

Rank

SIG.

Technology transfer

2.97

.93

1

3.00

.93

1

.896

Operation in good
condition

2.87

•86

2

2.92

.78

2

.825

Overhauling
guarantees

2.53

.86

3

2.88

.97

3

.558

Notes: S.D. = Standard Deviation

SIG. = Significance

* denotes significance at p < 0.05
The transfer phase is perhaps the most delicate part of the process in BOT
projects. In this phase, technology transfer, operation in good condition and
overhauling guarantees are very important factors. Foreign investors may earn
the trust of Chinese Government through the successive implementation of
BOT projects. A good relationship with the government can be established
through smooth transfer of the facility. And the probability of penetrating a
new market will be greatly increased. There is positive agreement between
government officials and foreign investors on the importance of these CSFs in
the transfer phase for BOT projects in China.
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Chapter 7: Case Studies for BOT Projects in China
This Chapter intends to study three BOT projects in China. Case study can
provide more detailed information to supplement the data obtained from the
mail survey. To confirm the survey findings and gain further insights about
BOT, three cases were selected for study. According to interviews with top
managers and study of company documents, three cases are studied with special
reference to the critical success factors (CSFs) referred to the survey. The
influences of the CSFs on these cases are also analysed.
Description of Cases
The three BOT projects are briefly described as follows:
Case 1: The first state-approved BOT in China, i.e. Laibin B power plant
project in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
Case 2 : The first provincial-approved and the first transferred BOT project in
China, i.e. Shajiao B thermal station in Guangdong Province.
Case 3 : The first BOT project in Shanghai, i.e. Yan’an Donglu Second
Tunnel.
Case 1 represents the first pilot BOT in China. It provides useful information
for the CSFs in future BOT. Case 2 represents the first BOT project in China
that reached the transfer stage. Case 3 represents the first tunnel project using
BOT in China. Case 2 and 3 also show how the CSFs influencing the
management of successful BOT projects.
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The main characteristics of the three cases are summarized in Table 7.1, and
the descriptions of the projects are given in the following section.
Table 7.1 Main Characteristics of Three BOT Projects
Characteristics

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Project type

Power plant

Thermal station

Tunnel

Location of project

Guangxi Region

Guangdong Province

Shanghai Municipality

Contract value

US$ 650 million

US$ 550 million

US$ 217 million

The concessionaire

The France
consortium

Hong Kcmgs
Hopewell Holdings

Hong Kong Jingli
Company Ltd. (HKJC)

Concession period

18 years (1997-2015)

15 years (1984-1999)

30 years (1994-2024)

Equity : debt rate

1:3.4

3:97

Rate of return

Not available

30%

1:2
Guaranteed at a
fixed rate of 15%
by the government

7.1 Case 1: LaibinB Power Plant Project
Introduction
China has introduced some innovations in BOT projects since the end of 1996
when the concession of the first state-approved BOT project, the Laibin B
Power Plant project (Laibin B) in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
was awarded. The State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC)
officially approved Laibin B as the pilot BOT in China.
Conceptual proposal
Laibin B is the second-phase project for the Laibin power plant, with an
estimated capacity of 2 x 350 MW coal-fired units and an estimated cost of
US$ 650 million. It is located in Laibin Country of Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region (Guangxi Region), a southern Chinese backwater province
where most foreign investors might not venture willingly. It was postponed for
many years as the Guangxi Government could not raise the required finance.
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The Guangxi Government then applied to the central government for approval
to adopt a BOT scheme to develop Laibin B.
In early 1995, the Bridge of Trust Infrastructure Consulting Co. Ltd. (Bridge of
Trust) submitted the executive proposal and financial feasibility study report
on behalf of Guangxi Government for constructing Laibin B on a BOT basis
after preparing the preliminary feasibility study in accordance with international
practice and in compliance with the actual requirements in China.
Pre-qualification
In August 1995, Bridge of Trust completed the pre-qualification documents for
Laibin B and publicly issued an Invitation for pre-qualification, inviting
potential investors from abroad to participate in the pre-qualification for this
pilot BOT project. The concession terms require a very tight completion
schedule and appear to offer a relatively low rate of return. But the prospect
of testing the new BOT framework was incentive enough for a number of
developers to submit tenders. A total of 31 applicants submitted their
applications for pre-qualification; 23 of which were individual companies, while
8 others were consortia, including some the best-known power utilities in the
world.
By early October 1995, Bridge of Trust and its advisors had reviewed the pre
qualification proposals submitted by each tender. The Evaluation Committee
then reached an unanimous agreement to list the applicants into two groups:
Group A, with 12 applicants, were companies that were allowed to tender
either individually or as a member of a consortium as they were considered to
be candidates with strong experience in developing power projects. They were
also seen as those with adequate financial strength as well as possessing other
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relevant experiences. The other applicants, listed as Group B, were allowed to
tender only in a consortium jointly with one or several of the Group A
applicants. Bridge of Trust issued the Invitation to Tender on behalf of
Guangxi Government on October 28,1995.
Tendering
On December 1995, Bridge of Trust completed the tender documents and
formally released them to the pre-qualified applicants. All 12 applicants in
Group A purchased the tender documents. Between December 1995 to May 7,
1996, several on-site inspections and Pre-tender meetings were organized to
clarify legal and financial issues for each potential tenderer.
By the end of 16:00 hrs on May 7,1996, a total of 6 tenderers had submitted
their proposals. They were:
-

China Energy Investment Co. Ltd. and Siemens consortium.

-

International Generating (HK) Co. Ltd.

-

Tomen Corporation, Singapore Power International (Pte) Ltd., Union Energy
Co. Ltd. and Toshiba Corporation consortium.

-

The France Consortium, which comprised the Electricite de France and GEC
Alsthom consortium.

-

National Power PLC (UK) and Mitsui & Co., Ltd.

-

New World Infrastructure Limited (UK), AEP Resources International and
ABB Energy Ventures consortium.

The Tender Opening was conducted the next day.
Tender evaluation
The Evaluation Committee clarified and analyzed the tender proposals from
legal, financial and technical angles, the tenders were ranked and the three
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most competitive tenderers were:
-

The France Consortium.

-

New World Infrastructure Limited (UK), AEP Resources International and
ABB Energy Ventures consortium.

-

International Generating (HK) Co. Ltd.

Negotiations were held with these tenderers till early November. The France
Consortium won the concession finally on November 11,1996.
Evaluation criteria
The evaluation criteria, which were used by the Evaluation Committee, are now
highlighted (Bridge of Trust, 1966).
(a) Electricity tariff (60% weight in evaluation)
One of the most important reasons why The France Consortium won the
concession was that it provided the lowest electricity tariffs (much lower than
the second competitor) of RMB 0.4 yuan (less than US$5 cents) per KWh
(before tax) which was close or equivalent to the current tariff in urban cities
of China. This offer, as estimated by the France Consortium, would yield a
return of 17.5%, lower than the company average of 18%. The Consortium’s
tender was reported to be based on a sub-contract to acquire turbines from a
Chinese manufacture, which helped keep costs down and was especially
welcomed by the Chinese Government. Setting high priority for low tariff is
due to the fact that China is still a socialist and developing country, and the
government has to protect its people from too high an electricity tariff
(b) Financing

proposal, technical

proposal

and

operation, maintenance

and

transferal (OMT) proposal (40% weight in evaluation).
The Guangxi Government considered the feasibility of the tenderer's financing
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proposal,

including financing schedule, financing cost, ability to finance and

extent of equity

committed

by the

tenderer; the

reliability

and

quality

of the technical proposal; and the feasibility and viability of OMT, including
the administration, personnel training and power plant transferral plan with
respect to the interests of Guangxi Government.
The reasons for the Guangxi Government adopting a lower weighting for the
technical

proposal is

that: the

tender

document

already

specified

that

international technical specifications and standards would be used for Laibin
B; lenders (banks) are more concerned with the technical feasibility of Laibin B
and would certainly examine more carefully the tenderer^ technical proposal.
Hence the Financing Proposal is more important than the technical proposal.
The Laibin B case serves to illustrate the importance of the CSFs in winning
a BOT concession.These are the pre-requisites for

a BOT project to be

successfully implemented.

phases

While the

latter three

of construction,

operation and transfer phases would show the project work in action, the first
three phases of proposal, negotiation and concession agreement are also of great
importance. The success of a BOT project depends on: the financial package
rather than the technical solutions; the identification of the responsibilities and
rights

of the

various

parties

involved

(e.g.

risk

allocation);

and

the

Government’s incentives etc. All these tasks should be carried out and
concluded in the first three phases. The France Consortium, comprised two
best-known power utilities in the world, was more competitive in terms of its
ability to maintain its profitability while providing the lowest electricity tariffs.
In addition, the acquisition of turbines from the local manufacturer was a
clever strategy that

gained

goodwill from the Chinese Government while
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keeping costs down. Thus, it can be concluded that where the competition
is stiff, the promoter must be more innovative in the provision of guarantees
and special features in their tender.
The contractual structure of Laibin B is illustrated in Fig. 7.

Figure 7 Laibin B’s Contractual Structure
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7.2 Case 2: Shajiao B Thermal Station Project
Introduction
China's first BOT project, a large thermal power plant, was transferred by its
Hong Kong investor to the local owner in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province in
Sept. 7, 1999. Shajiao B thermal station (Shajiao B) was built in the mid1980s by Hopewell Holdings of Hong Kong, using the BOT approach. It was
the first BOT large-scale infrastructure project on the mainland, and merely the
first to reach the transfer stage. Under the BOT agreement, the Hong Kong
firm raised funds for the coal-fired plant, designed it and constructed it,
exercising rights to operate it for 12 year. The thermal station went into use
in 1987, and by the end of July, 1997 it had generated 46.2 billion kwh of
electricity at an average price of 0.38 yuan/kwh. During the initial years,
Shajiao B produced one-fourth of the generation of the Guangdong power
system. The project had given immense contribution to Guangdong’s economy
and supported the development of the entire Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
The project showed that the Chinese Government allowed overseas investors to
earn legal profits.
The Shajiao B is near Tai Ping on the Pearl River Estuary, about halfway
between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. It is next to the Shajiao A power station,
which was built by China. The declared cost of the 2 x 350 MW Shajiao B
was HKS4000 million. Mitsui & Co. was the commercial leader; Toshiba
Corporation was the technical coordinator and the principal plant supplier. The
design, manufacturing, delivery, construction, test and commissioning
a foil turnkey basis.
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Hopewell Holdings of Hong Kong was responsible for the financing of all
the construction costs of the station, and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Power Development Company gave a commitment to purchase a minimum
amount of electricity from the station at a predetermined price throughout the
agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the project company had to put
into commercial operation two units with capacities of 350 MW by 1 April
1988. The profit gained before 1 April 1988 due to the early commissioning
of the Shajiao B was given to the project company as a bonus. This station
was actually completed earlier than scheduled by more than six months, and
the bonus was of the order of HKS400M. The performance of the Shajiao B
has been satisfactory. The first unit was synchronized on 18 April 1987, and
achieved full load for the first time on 14 May 1987. From an ease of
operation point of view, the Shajiao B compareed favourably with other plants.
A high level of automatic control was provided, and labour saving equipment
was provided for materials handling.
The remarkable features of the project are follows:
Enter the entrepreneur
Known to both the Guangdong and Shenzhen officials was a Hong Kong
businessman, Gorden Wu,

head

of Hopewell

Holdings

of Hong

Kong.

(Hopewell) Mr. Wu was already funding and building a 1200 room hotel in
Guangzhou in 1983. Mr. Wu was held in high regard by these officials. There
followed a period of negotiation with others such as Bechtel Group and Mitsui
Corp. of Japan with both making proposals of Shajiao B directly to the
Chinese Government. Gordon Wu5s credibility and persuasion eventually won
the contract.
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Special guarantees by the Government
-

The Chinese Government agreed to purchase

汪

minimum quantity of

electricity on a “take and pay” basis and to pay Hopewell a fixed price
per kilowatt hour over the 10-year “Cooperation Period.”
-

The Chinese also agreed to arrange for the supply of coal over the
cooperation period at a fixed price per tonne. Payments for fuel were
made from the electricity sales proceeds.

-

The government assisted in the arrangement of an “emergency loan
facility” to the investor group to provide funds in the event of “force
majeure”.

Financial package
-

Hopewell

arranged

the

project

financing

from

a

syndicate

of

46

international banks. The banks agreed to look only to the electricity sales
proceeds for repayment. Hopewell negotiated a “turnkey contract” （ fixed
price, fixed

completion, agreed quality) with a consortium of equipment

suppliers and contractors. Deferred credits were provided by the consortium
allowing for repayments over a 7 year period. Operation and maintenance
expenses were also paid for from electricity sales proceeds.
-

The project cost of US$512 million equivalent was to be funded by a
combination of shareholder equity, subordinated loans (Renminbi), deferred
payments and a variety of debt packages. The bulk of the debt financing
took the form of a supplier credit from Japan arranged by Mitsui & Corp.
This supplier credit was backed by Export Import Bank of Japan and was
denominated in Yen (Japanese currency). The sponsors were attracted by
the 10 year fixed interest rate on offer and the Chinese authorities were
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willing to accept the exchange risk. A renminbi loan was taken from PRC
banking sources on a deferred payment basis. Yen loans was highly
innovate at the time, and was successfully concluded in April 1986.
Select suitable subcontractor
The construction was aimed at synchronizing the first unit as soon as
possible. Toshiba corp. (Toshiba) is a experienced subcontractor. The cooling
water pumps, generator transformers, bunker bay and ancillary water systems
and 500 KW switchgear were outside the superstructure, and so the erection of
these plant items commenced as soon as the civil foundations had been
completed. The location of this equipment out of doors is normal Toshiba
practice, except for the ancillary water systems, where Toshiba followed the
practice of its subcontractor. In line with Toshiba’s
Toshiba

layout

considerations

standard

practice,

are generally good ideas. Up to date, other

power plant builders are now generally using these ideas in larger 600 MW
and 900 MW designs.
Risk-sharing
-

Hopewell committed to develop the project on a fixed price turnkey basis
thus took delay and cost overrun risks. An “early generation” bonus was
built into the contract and conversely penalties in respect of delay.
Hopewell in turn protected their interests by signing a contract on a fixed
price turnkey basis with Mitsui & Corp. who were leading a consortium
comprising Toshiba Corp. for turbines and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy
Industries (M ) for boilers.

-

A Hopewell

subsidiary, Slipform

Engineering

Ltd., undertook

the

civil

engineering work and also took responsibility for the overall coordination

96

Chapter 7: Case Studies for BOT Projects in China

of the project. Contracts were also signed with James Williamson &
associates Co. for detailed design of the civil works. Ewbank Preece
Engineering

Ltd.

and

engineering consultants.

Guangdong

Power

Design

Institute

were

the

Frank and Vargeson Co. were the quantity

surveyors.
Refinancing
The 49 billion Japanese supplier credit (fixed rate 7.3%) was replaced by a
floating rate in 1987. The floating rate was subsequently swapped into fixed
rate at a blend of about 5.4% p.a. This resulted in interest cost savings of
about US$40 million during the remaining loan life.
The project can be classified as a successful BOT project. The reasons behind
the Shajiao B success are itemized as follows:
•

Involvement of Gordon Wu, the BOT champion of southern China.

-

A huge demand for electrical power in Guangdong Province.

-

Government officials willing to cooperate with foreign investors.

-

Tried and tested turbine and construction technology.

-

Credible participation of key players such as Mitsui & Corp.s Toshiba Corp. etc.

-

Completion time was 6 months ahead of schedule. This resulted in a
(US$50m) generation bonus for Hopewell. This drew initial protect from
the Chinese side. The objection was quickly overcome however when it
was pointed out that the 3.1 billion kilowatt hours generated ahead of
schedule permitted factory production in Guangdong Province amounting to
some US$500m in economic value which would otherwise have been lost
due to factory closures through power shortages.
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7.3 Case 3: Yan’an Donglu Second Tunnel Project
Introduction
The Yan9^

Donglu Second (YD2nd) Tunnel is located 100m south of the

existing Yan’an Donglu first (YD 1st) Tunnel in Shanghai. The Tunnel is
needed to cope

with the

economic development in the Pudong

Special

Economic Zone in Shanghai and for improving the transportation facilities
across the Huangpu River which passes through the Shanghai city centre. The
YD 1st Tunnel is equipped with only two lanes, and is the worst bottleneck
section connecting Pudong and the centre of Shanghai. The traffic

flow in

1991 reached 1600 vehicles per hour, which exceeded the design capacity by
over 40%. Therefore, there was an urgent need for the YD2nd Tunnel. The
YD2nd Tunnel was chosen

as the first BOT project in Shanghai by the

Shanghai Municipality Government (MG) in 1992. It will be important for
improving the investment climate and promoting the economic development of
both sides of the tunnel
The YD2nd tunnel is 2193m long and is equipped with two lanes, the total
width of which is 7.5m. The toll plaza is located as the Pudong District side
and has a total of 12 toll booths. There are a total of six drainage pump
stations, one ventilation pavilion, one central control room, one transformer
station and an administration office to be built for the YD2nd Tunnel. YDlst
and YD2nd tunnels

are all used

for passenger transportation and public

buses.
The project structure
(a) Concessionaire
The concessionaire is the Hong Kong Jingli company Ltd (HKJC). The guarantor
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of the HKJC is the China International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC),
which is a Chinese company based in Hong Kong.
(b) Project financing
The total investment in the project is 1800 million RMB (US$217 million).
The debt-equity ratio is 2:1. The registered equity capital is 600 million RMB.
The total debt is 1200 million RMB, which is borrowed by the concessionaire
in the form of bank loans.
(c) Concession period
The concession period

is

30 years， from

1994 to

2024， including the

construction period. The concessionaire was granted exclusive rights by the
Shanghai MG in 1993 to operate the existing tunnel, the YD 1st Tunnel, and to
finance, build, operate and maintain a new tunnel, i.e. the YD2nd Tunnel. The
YD 1st Tunnel has been in operation since 1988. The construction of YD2nd
Tunnel commenced in January 1994 and it came into operation in December
1996.
Development o f the YD2nd tunnel project
The whole process consists of six phases: submission of a BOT proposal to
Shanghai MG; negotiation and signing of the concession agreement and related
regulations; forming of the concessionaire; construction of the YD2nd Tunnel
and operation of the YD 1st; operation and maintenance of both the YD 1st and
YD2nd Tunnels; transfer of both tunnels to the Government free of charge
at the end of the concession period.
Risk management in the YD2ND tunnel project
The technical, financial, operational and transferal natures of a BOT project
determine that there are risks existing for the project not only during the
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construction phases, but also during the operation and transfer phases. There
are several characteristics related to the YD2nd Tunnel project which requires
special attention. For example, it passes through a densely populated area and
its construction schedule was tight. Only 3 years are allowed by Shanghai MG
to the concessionaire in which construct the YD2nd Tunnel. This is a short
period compared with the construction period of 6 years for the YD 1st
Tunnel. Therefore, risk management is important in YD 2nd Tunnel project.
The concessionaire divided the project into different packages and assigned
specific personnel to be responsible for every portion of investment.
Government guarantees
The government’s guarantees to this BOT project support the cash flow of the
project and raise the level of confidence of investors and lenders. The
Shanghai MG has made the following guarantees to the concessionaire in
addition to granting exclusive rights of constructing and operating the YD2nd
Tunnel:
-

Granting the concessionaire the exclusive right to operate the existing
YDlst Tunnel for the same concession period as the YD2nd Tunnel, i.e.
30 years. Since the YDlst Tunnel is already charging tolls, the operating
income of this existing tunnel will improve the concessionaire’s cash flow
from the beginning of the concession, and will reduce the concessionaire’s
market and revenue risks.

-

Guaranteeing the concessionaire the expected rate of return on the
investment. If the concessionaire’s operating profit is lower than expected,
the

Shanghai

MG

will

take

some

measures, such

as

granting

the

concessionaire opportunities in undertaking other projects, to enable the
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concessionaire to achieve the expected revenue. Hence, the concessionaire is
financially

protected

during the

operational

phase by

provisions

for

unanticipated increases in electricity tariff and wages, as well as unforeseen
cost rises beyond its control which are a result of changes in laws and
delay in approvals. This greatly reduces the impact of operation cost
overrun risks on the project revenues.
■ Guaranteeing the HKJC's rate of return on investment after taxes at a
fixed rate of 15%. Although this guarantee caps the HKJC5s profit, it is
important for HKJC because the risks it should bear during the concession
period have been mitigated and transferred to other parties.
•

Giving the

concessionaire

limited

commercial

freedom

including

the

freedom to determine its tariffs to cover inflation. The Shanghai MG will
also adjust the tariffs of other facilities crossing the Huangpu River to
match the new tariffs of the BOT project. This will ensure that the traffic
flow of the project does not suffer a decline as a result of the differences
in the levels of tariff.
-

Granting the concessionaire the right to pay dividends after the loan
principal

and interests are repaid. In addition, starting from the first

profile-making year, the concessionaire will benefit from a 5-year complete
exemption from any income tax. Therefore, the concessionaire will benefit
from a 50% exemption from any tax for another 5 years. This will reduce
the concessionaire’s financing and revenue risks， and improve its cash flow.
However, as one-third of the total toll would be levied by Shanghai MG as
the Additional Fee for Urban Development

(AFUD), the concessionaire is

actually levied one-third of paid taxes. Nevertheless， this does not represent a
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serious problem for the HKJC since its rate of return is already guaranteed
at a fixed rate of 15%.
-

Granting the concessionaire the right to acquire the land required for the
project. However, the concessionaire should acquire the land in its own
time and at its own cost as agreed by both sides. The Shanghai MG also
guarantees that they provide assistance to the concessionaire if the latter
encounters any difficulty during the acquisition process.

Advantages o f the BOT model for the YD2nd project
There are obvious advantages for China in adopting the BOT model. These are
discussed below :
(a) Control on project investment
China， urban infrastructure projects have been plagued with problems such as
cost overruns, construction delays and poor quality. Although tendering and
contracting processes are adopted for these projects， it is still difficult for the
government to control the

investment.

This is mainly because

of the

bureaucracy in the government departments. By adopting the BOT model,
foreign investors, such as the HKJC, are involved as part of the investment and
the investment has to be repaid. The 'survival5 of the investment is closely
related to the rate of return on the investment. Thus, the concessionaire will
take every measure to effectively control the investment during the whole
concession period.
(b) International competitive tendering process is introduced
Under the concession agreement, the company could procure equipment through
international competitive tender. The benefits are reducing equipment costs in
comparison with estimated prices. For example, the original estimate for the
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monitoring system of the YD2nd Tunnel is 30 million RMB. A competitive
open-tendering process lowered the bid price of a high-quality monitoring
system, which was imported from Germany and Singapore, to 20 million RMB.
The price of the ventilation machine was also lowered through competition
between suppliers from Sweden, Denmark, Japan, UK and Germany.
( c ) Construction schedule is accelerated
As mentioned above, the concession period consists of a construction period
and an operation period. The shorter the construction period, the longer the
operation period, and therefore, the concessionaire will earn revenues earlier.
The financial benefit of an accelerated schedule motivates the concessionaire to
closely control the construction schedule, quality and cost.
(d) Adapting update computer software
The existing computer software package for YD 1st Tunnel was purchased off
the shelf from a foreign vendor. However, the foreign software could not
handle the local situation and could not be modified locally. The modification
could only be made by the original foreign designer, which proved to be
costly. However, for the YD2nd Tunnel, only the system software was imported
while the application programs were developed locally and these work well
with the characteristics of tunnels in Shanghai.
(e) Modem management techniques are adopted
In this project, the concessionaire adopted modem management techniques such
as reducing the number of administrative staff members and adopting the plando-control-advance (PEXTA) management technique.
(f) Operation cost reduction
For the BOT model, the project sponsor is usually the investor, the constructor
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and the operator all rolled into one. This arrangement makes the sponsor bear
all the risks through the concession period, and hence, makes the sponsor do
its best construction, and operation the project vsdth the lowest cost in order to
realize maximum profit. In the past, there was a lack of interdisciplinary
coordination among various aspects of design, construction and operation. The
designer was not used to considering the design constructability and the
operation reliability, and these conflicts were difficult to resolve. For example,
some valves in the YD 1st Tunnel are located in too high a position for easy
maintenance by operators.
By adopting the BOT model, the concessionaire, as both the investor and the
operator, treats the design, construction and operation as various phases of a
complete

project

management process.

During the

design

phase, various

requirements which will occur in the operation phase have been considered
and related construction/operation personnel are also involved in the design.
The systematic operation of both the YD 1st and YD2nd Tunnels has also been
jointly simulated through experiments to optimize the design and to eliminate
design faults. The power consumption was reduced by actively managing the
ventilation flow and adopting fluorescent lighting.

The number of staff

employed was also reduced. These measures reduced the operation costs.
(g) Work efficiency is improved
Before market reform was introduced into China, an employee earned the same
amount of income as others regardless of how skilled or how hardworking
they were. This was one of the biggest problems in former management. There
were more than 300 staff members employed on the YDlst Tunnel alone. By
adopting the BOT model, the Board of Directors employed only 220 hardworking
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and skilled persons to operate both the YD 1st and YD2nd Tunnels.
Disadvantages o f the BOT model
(a) Guaranteeing the rate of return on investment of the HKLC
In the YD2nd Tunnel project, the rate of return on investment for the HKJC is
guaranteed at

15%, i.e.

the

HKJC

does

not

bear

as

many

risks

or

responsibilities as it should. As far as the guarantee on the rate of return is
concerned, the YD2nd Tunnel is the only one which received such a
guarantee, and therefore, is not an international practice. Linking risk and return
is the basis on which the BOT model should be promoted. Only by linking
the rated return to risks can the concessionaire be motivated to do its best to
control investment, improve service and contribute to society by paying taxes.
The BOT features adopted for the YD2nd Tunnel have many advantages both
for the host government and for the foreign investor. However, guaranteeing
the concessionaire and the rate of return of the HKJC, have limited the
advantages of the BOT model in that, while the risks are reduced, the upside
potential of return on investment is also foregone.
(b) The levying of the AFUD
Although tax concessions and preferential tax rates are provided for the
concession agreement, the concessionaire is actually levied at 33% of total
tariff income as tax. Levying the AFUD at 33% imposes a big financial
burden on the concessionaire. It would be more practical for the government
to levy, according to the project's risk, an alternative concession tax instead of
the current 33% of total tariff income as the AFUD. The concession tax at
different rates could be levied according to the project type and concession
period. Progressive concession tax rates could also be applied in case the
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actual operating income is higher than expected.

For example, different

mechanisms are used for BOT projects in Hong Kong. In the case of the
Western Harbour Crossing, a toll

adjustment

mechanism

was

introduced

whereby any revenues earned above the predicted cash flow go into a special
toll stability fund which will be used to put off toll increases.
The YD2nd Tunnel represented a BOT project which was implemented in
Shanghai during the period of economic

expansion.

Doing infrastructure

business in China presents many risks and uncertainties, it is especially crucial
to give special attention to the CSFs and choose the right path for a
successful BOT investment.

7.4 Discussion
The case studies were analysed with special reference to the CSFs referred to
Chapter 6. The influences of the CSFs on each case, as shown in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2 The Influence of the CSFs on Three BOT Projects
Development Phases of
BOT Projects

The CSFs

Influence to BOT
Case 1

Preliminary qualification
evaluation phase

Tendering phase

Concession award phase

Construction phase

Operation phase

Transfer phase

Note:

Case 2

Case 3

Appropriate project identification

+

+

+

Stable political and economic situation

+

+

+

Favorable legislation and regulations

+

+

-

The capability of project promoter

-

+

-

Experience with BOT project by promoter

-

+

-

Lack of funds for infrastructure projects

+

+

-

Competitive tendering system

+

-

+

Attractive financial package

+

+

+

Acceptable tolIAariff levels

+

+

+

Technical solution advantage

-

+

-

Select suitable project agencies

+

-

-

Concrete and precise concession agreement

+

-

+

Reasonable risk allocation

+

+

+

Special guarantees by the government

-

+

+

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency insurance

+

NA

NA

Quality control and supervision

-

+

Select suitable subcontractor

+

+

Standardization of engineering contract

-

+

A multidisciplinary and multinational team

+

-

Good relationship with government authorities

+

-

Management control

+

+

Training local staff

+

■

Sound environmental impact

-

+

Public safety

-

+

Technology transfer

+

Operation in good condition

-

Oveiiiauling guarantees

-

means the CSF had strong influence on the project involved;
means the CSF had little influence on the project involved;
“NA” means not available
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as shown in Table 7.2, the CSFs of appropriate project identification, stable
political

and

economic

situation, competitive

tendering

system, attractive

financial package, acceptable toll/tariff levels, concrete and precise concession
agreement, reasonable risk allocation and selective suitable subcontractor are
very important CSFs in the three cases. These CSFs had strong influence on
the project involved.
Appropriate project identification
One of the key factors in winning BOT projects is to identify and choose the
appropriate project. The three cases, serve to illustrate the importance of this
factor.
For case 1， Laibin B is located in Laibin Country of Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region (Guangxi Region), a southern Chinese backwater province
where most foreign investors might not venture willingly. The power shortage
of Guangxi Main Power Grid is more serious. It was postponed for many
years as the Guangxi Government could not raise the required finance. The
construction of the Power Plant has a great importance for redressing the
imbalance between power supply and demand in Guangxi, and improving
operating conditions and economic viability of Guangxi Power Network. The
Power Plant is located both in the centre of Guangxi Main Power Grid. Thus,
the construction of the Power Plant is of fundamental importance for
improving the safety and stability of Guangxi Main Power Grid and the
reliability of the whole South China Power Grid. If the Laibin B BOT
experiment works, it is argued, then financing the rest of China’s vast power
requirements will

be that much easier. Laibin B will
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model

of similar future BOT projects for the construction of roads, ports,

bridges and airport development.
For case 2, The Shajiao B power station is near Tai Ping on the Pearl River
Estuary, about halfway between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. It is next to the
Shajiao A power station, which was built by China. HopewelFs BOT proposal
for the Shajiao B power plant was approved because there was a serious
shortage of power and the Chinese Government did not have enough foreign
exchange to build more power plants.

The accepted need is that the

governments are aware of the problem and is serious in attempting to solve it.
For case 3, The Yan’an Donglu Second (YD2nd) Tunnel is located 100m
south of the existing Yan5an Donglu first (YD 1st) Tunnel in Shanghai. The
Tunnel is needed to cope with the economic development in the Pudong
Special Economic Zone in Shanghai and for improving the transportation
facilities across the Huangpu River which passes through the Shanghai city
centre. The YDlst Tunnel is equipped with only two lanes, and is the worst
bottleneck section connecting Pudong and the centre of Shanghai. The traffic
flow in 1991 reached 1600 vehicles per hour, which exceeded the design
capacity by over 40%. Therefore, there was an urgent need for the YD2nd
Tunnel, and for improving the investment climate and promoting the economic
development of both sides of the tunnel.
Stable political and economic situation
Since the economic reform started in 1978, China has become the world’s
fastest growing economy at an average annual rate of 9% in real terms for
the past 15 years. The rapid economic expansion has created the largest
infrastructure

market

in

the

world. Chinese Government
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demonstrated

their

intention

to

adopt

BOT

contracts

in

infrastructure

investments. Hence, political and economic situation in China were stable for
the three BOT projects.
Attractive financial package
The financing package should be carefully tailored to the characteristics of the
project. Under

the

BOT

model,

it

is

the

commercial

and

financial

considerations, rather than the technical elements, that are likely to be the final
determinants in winning the BOT concession.
For case 1, Electricite de France and GEC Alsthom consortium won the US$
650 million contract on BOT basis. Debt/equity ration is 3.4 : 1. Coface, the
France’s export-credit agency provides 30% of investment in equity and
equipment.
For case 2, Hopewell arranged the project financing from a syndicate of 46
international banks. The banks agreed to look only to the electricity sales
proceeds for repayment. The project cost of US$512 million equivalent was to
be

funded by a combination

of shareholder equity, subordinated

loans

(Renminbi), deferred payments and a variety of debt packages. The bulk of the
debt financing took the form of a supplier credit from Japan arranged

by

Mitsui & Corp. This supplier credit was backed by Export Import Bank of
Japan and was denominated in Yen (Japanese currency). The sponsors were
attracted by the 10 year fixed interest rate on offer and the Chinese
authorities were willing to accept the exchange risk. A renminbi loan was
taken from PRC banking sources on a deferred payment basis. Yen loans was
highly innovate at the time, was successfully concluded in April 1986.
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For case 3, total investment in the project is 1800 million RMB (US$217
million). The debt-equity

ratio is 2:1. The registered

equity

capital is 600

million RMB. The total debt is 1200 million RMB, which was borrowed by
the concessionaire in the form of bank loans. The guarantor of the project
was the China International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC), a Chinese
company based in Hong Kong.
Acceptable toll/tariff levels
Toll/TarifF levels need to be reasonable from the point of view of consumers
so that they are not burdensome, as well as from the point of view of the
investors and lenders so that the revenues are adequate to compensate them.
For case 1, one of the most important reasons why The France Consortium
won the concession is that it provided the lowest electricity tariffs (much
lower than the second competitor) of RMB 0.4 yuan (less than US$5 cents)
per KWh (before tax) which is close or equivalent to the current tariff in
urban cities of China. This offer, as estimated by the France Consortium,
would yield a return of 17.5%, lower than the company average of 18%.
For case 2, one of the proposals contained in Hopewell's winning bid was
that it would guarantee the Chinese Government a fixed electricity price per
kilowatt-hour for 10 years at a level that was equal to or lower than the
price the Chinese were paying to import power from Hong Kong.
For case 3, setting high priority for low tariff is due to the fact that China is
still a socialist and developing country, and the government has to protect its
people from too high an toll level. Acceptable toll level was adopted by the
project company in YD 2nd tunnel project.
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Reasonable risk allocation
Because BOT projects are typically financed primarily on a limited or non
recourse basis with the cash flow generated by

the project and the project

assets constituting the principal project security, project promoter in BOT
projects have become particularly sensitive to the need to identify and allocate
project risks at

a very

early stage of the development of the projects.

Contractual agreements, guarantees and precise assignments are the predominant
techniques used to distribute risk in BOT projects.
For case 1， the identification of the responsibilities, rights of the various
parties involved and the govemmenfs incentives etc. allocated the project risks.
In case 2， Hopewell negotiated a “turnkey contract” (fixed price, fixed
completion, agreed quality) with a consortium of equipment suppliers and
contractors. Deferred credits were provided by the consortium allowing for
repayments over a 7 year period. Hopewell also negotiated for half of the
electricity price to be paid in foreign currency. The other half was in the
nonconvertible Chinese currency of Renminbi and was used to pay for
Chinese coal. This effectively covered the foreign exchange risk.
For case 3， granting the concessionaire the exclusive right to operate the
existing YD 1st Tunnel for the same concession period; guaranteeing the
concessionaire the expected rate of return on the investment; giving the
concessionaire limited commercial freedom including the freedom to determine
its tariffs to cover inflation, etc. greatly reduced the risks of the project.
Select suitable subcontractor
Selection suitable subcontractor for a BOT project is critical because it
directly affects the outcome of the project. Essentially, the project company
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Chapter 8: A Predictive Model of CSFs for BOT Projects Implementation
in China
The commitment of a BOT project involves various procedures that are
affected by many internal and external factors. The CSFs in this study may
not be the necessary division, but they were derived through the research
process of extensive

literature

review and interviews with

professionals

involved in BOT projects. They were confirmed through survey research and
case studies. They cover a full range of important aspects from identification
of a suitable project to the final transfer to the government. They represent a
mutually exclusive set of factors that helps to develop a research model of
CSFs for BOT projects implementation in China. Based on the survey result
and case studies, a CSFs model for investing in future BOT projects in China
is proposed.
The following thirteen components are encompassed in this model:
(1) Appropriate project identification; (2) Stable political & economic situation;
(3) Attractive financial package; (4) Acceptable toll/tarifF levels; (5) Reasonable
risk allocation; (6) Select suitable subcontractor; (7) Management control; (8)
Technology transfer; (9) Successful preliminary evaluation phase; (10) Winning
BOT contracts; (11) Successful construction phase; (12) Successful operation
phase; (13) Successful transfer phase. The components from 1 to 8 are
independent variables while the last five components are dependent variables.
This CSFs model for exploring BOT projects in China is depicted in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. A Model of CSFs for BOT Projects Implementation in China

No

In this model, arrows that show the direction of postulated influence indicate
possible causality between components. This model assumes that there is a
one-way flow of causation.

The

solid

lines

together with the

arrows

hierarchically show how determinants cause or influence other determinants.
The dotted lines show the other factors may influence on the project involved
to certain extent. The model of propositions, as indicated by the links between
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the constructs, reflect a number of the potential relationships that are supported
by the survey results and the case studies.
Eight propositions are developed in five categories based on the literature
review, survey result and case studies as follows:
I. Preliminary Evaluation Phase
PI : The greater the attention devoted to the project identification, the greater
the possibility of more favorable outcome for China BOT projects

in

preliminary phase.
China has openly declared BOT as the main means of privatizing public
services and has drawn up a long list of projects for foreign investors to
undertake. Foreign investors must be cautious in selecting the appropriate
project to prepare the proposal. There should be a demonstrated and accepted
need for the project in China. The cost of the project should be reasonably
within what foreign investors sector can afford. Foreign investors will naturally
be most interested in those projects which have the greatest potential to be
“commercially” profitable. They would invest in a project if they were
reasonably certain that they can recoup their investment, as well as making an
adequate profit. Therefore, appropriate project identification has a positive
effect on outcome of BOT projects in preliminary evaluation phase.
P2 : The more stable political and economic situation, the BOT projects will
achieve better outcome during preliminary evaluation phase.
The successful application of BOT concept requires the presence of certain
background

environment. The political will and economic situation

of the

host government to support the project are important. A stable and supportive
political climate is a pre-condition for BOT projects. The rapid economic
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expansion has created the largest infrastructure market in China. As part of
their effort to attract foreign investment into infrastructure sector, Chinese
government has repeatedly demonstrated their intention to adopt BOT contracts
in infrastructure investments. However, at present, the authorities have little
incentive to speed up the approval of foreign currency financing including
BOT projects because of the Asian financial crisis. Therefore, it is necessary
to carefully re-examine project and the assumptions they are based on, taking
into account the updated economic and political situation for foreign investors.
II. Winning BOT contract
P3 : The more attractive the financial packages are， the greater the possibility
of winning BOT projects in China for foreign investors.
Financing package should be carefully tailored to the characteristics of the
project. Under

the

BOT

model,

it

is

the

commercial

and

financial

considerations, rather than technical elements, that are likely to be the final
determinants in winning the BOT concession. An attractive financial package
must be based on the principles of low capital cost, low operation and
maintenance cost, credibility, minimal financial risks to the government, and
minimal burden on debt-servicing

capability

of project revenues. A

BOT

investor’s ability to arrange an innovative, flexible, and attractive financial
package seems to be a crucial element behind its success in winning BOT
projects.
P4 : The more reasonable the toll/tarifF levels are, foreign investors are more
likely to win the BOT contracts.
Toll/Tariff levels need to be reasonable from the point of view of consumers
so that they are not burdensome, as well as from the point of view of the
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investors and lenders so that revenues are adequate. Balancing these conflicting
interests is a very delicate task. Setting high priority for low toll/tariff is due
to

the fact that China is still a socialist and developing country, and the

government has to protect its people from high toll/tariff levels. Therefore,
acceptable toll/tariff levels has a positive effect on outcome of winning BOT
contracts.
P5 : The more acceptable level of risk allocation, the greater the possibility of
winning BOT contracts.
Because BOT projects are typically financed on a limited or non-recourse
basis with the cash flow generated by the project and the project assets
constituting the principal project security, project promoter in BOT projects
have become particularly sensitive to the need to identify and allocate project
risks at a very early stage of the development of the projects. Efficient
allocation of risks has been critical in marking a project financeable.
HI. Construction phase
P6 : The more selective the process for identifying suitable subcontractor， the
better the performance outcome for construction of BOT projects.
Essentially, the project company should analyze the various attributes of
potential subcontractors and choose the one that can complement them most in
terms of needs. The project companies usually search for subcontractors who
have compatible objectives, are experienced in BOT projects, specialize in
technical skills with suitable management styles， and are trust worthy and
financially

credible.

In

addition

to

financial

aspects,

management

competence and complementary skills are also essential ingredients of prospective
subcontractors. Subcontractor selection for a BOT project has a positive effect
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on the outcome of the project.
IV. Operation Phase
P7 : The higher the level of management control, the greater the possibility for
BOT projects to operate successfully.
Management control would be essential for a

successful operation of

the

facility. Contemporary network planning techniques and computer-based project
management systems should be used in the BOT projects. In order to survive
under the competitive global market, the trend is towards flatten organization
structure so that quick response to market changes can be made. As such,
empowerment is the approach adopted by Western companies. However,
employee’s maturity level has to be high before empowerment can be
implemented effectively. In China, where empolyees5 maturity has to be
worked on first, 汪 more authoritative style of management seems more
appropriate.
V. Transfer phase
P8 : The greater the willingness to effectively transfer technology, the greater
likelihood for BOT projects to transfer smoothly.
A significant trend in BOT projects has been the requirement for transfer of
advanced technology through concessionaire from more developed country
participants to

the

local

participants

in projects

within

less

developed

countries. The issue of technology transfer has been increasingly focused on
management science, distinct operation means and methods, and ultimate project
production technology. The effective technology transfer during the transfer
phase has a positive effect on the performance for BOT projects.
From identification of a suitable project, construction, operation, to the final
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transfer to the government, these phases may take a long period of time.
Each phase’s success determines the fate of the next phase. For a successful
BOT project, foreign

investors must pay attention to

the CSFs in every

phase. Such unique and critical information could have strong managerial
implications for foreign investors considering undertaking BOT projects work
in China, as well as for those who are intending to do so in the future.
The model reflects the importance and characteristics of the CSFs

in

supporting the competitive strategies in BOT projects. It is hoped that this
model would help foreign investors in improving their decision-making process
for their investing in BOT projects.

If potential BOT promoters give special

and continues attention to the model, it will increase their chances of securing
a profitable BOT project and implementation it smoothly.
The application of BOT projects has a relatively short history all across the
world， and even more so in China. Therefore, the BOT method of project
development may not be well understood and sometimes may not be well
received by foreign investors and the government agencies handling it. This
may affect the accuracy for the selection of the CSFs. Therefore, this model of
CSFs for BOT projects implementation in China is only a schematic one of
which could be tested/modified in the future.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations
9.1 Conclusions
The tremendous growth of the economy in China has resulted in an immense
demand

for

infrastructure

development. The

BOT

method

of

project

development has been proclaimed as bringing a new age in infrastructure.
Especially, a bilateral agreement on China’s accession to WTO signed by the
Chinese

and

US

delegations opens tremendous

opportunities

for

foreign

investors to enter/penetrate into new markets in China.
For resuming its signatory status of GATT, as early as in 1986, China had
formally notified the secretary general of the organization for such a request.
Since then China has engaged in 13-year-long negotiations for its entry to
GATT, and later on, WTO and its most important counterpart is always the
USA. The bilateral deal signed between the two countries, therefore, marked
the basic solution of key issues involved in China's entry to WTO. Accession
to WTO

would help China for its part participate in the optimized world

allocation of resources. Thus, to combine its advantageous resources of labor
forces, land and natural resources with those of other’s in the world of capital,
advanced technology and management, this will create opportunities for faster
economic growth of the country. While the agreement was unlikely to lead to
an immediate surge in foreign investment, it could attract significant capital in
sectors where foreign investment has been difficult or prohibited. Foremost
among these were telecommunications, distribution, wholesaling, logistics and
financial services. Thus, such preceding potential investment opportunities have
demonstrated the good future for applying BOT in China. The conclusion
made from the survey and the case studies is that the CSFs can be of
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different criticalities

as far as a BOT project is concerned.

nevertheless important, and all the CSFs are supported by
and

They

are

foreign investors

government officials. The analyses in this paper also showed that there

is generally positive agreements between the

foreign investors and the

government officials on the importance of the CSFs, even though the order of
ranking on importance of the CSFs may be different.
Both government officials and foreign investors agreed that the CSFs of
appropriate project identification and stable political and economic situation
are the most important factors in the preliminary qualification evaluation
phase. There is greater importance attached to the CSFs of competitive
tendering system, attractive financial package and acceptable toll/tariff levels
than the other two CSFs in tendering phase for government officials and
foreign investors. The CSFs of concrete and precise concession agreement,
reasonable risk allocation and special guarantees by the government are more
critical in concession award phase for both parties. There is concurrence of
views between the government officials and the foreign investors as far as the
importance of these
combination of these

CSFs in winning BOT projects are concerned.

A

factors forms the basis of a total solution approach by

the promoters to meet the needs of the government and to prevail against all
odds, beat the competition, and eventually win the BOT concession.
The CSFs of quality control and supervision and select suitable subcontractor
in construction phase have significant difference between the foreign investors
and the government officials. The significant difference on the CSF of quality
control and supervision may be because the government officials have different
set of interests, as compared to foreign investors, which are more social and
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political driven than profit driven. From the government’s point of view， a
BOT project should be designed and built to higher standards than traditional
project. This coupled with adoption of quality assurance and supervision
system

and

the

interesting

roles

of

BOT

projects, encourages

greater

cooperation and a less adversarial approach to problem-solving. However, the
primary goal and interest of foreign investors in a BOT project is naturally to
ensure an adequate return on their investment before the end of the
concession period. For foreign investors, there is little incentive to ensure that
the facility remains financially or technically viable after it has been
transferred to the government. The significant difference on the CSF of select
suitable subcontractor may be because the main contractors for the project are
often also the principal promoter of the project and they tend to select
subcontractors from the team themselves. In contrast, the government would
hope that the local subcontractors are chosen. In the operation phase, the
CSFs of management control and training local staff are very critical. There is
an agreement on the CSFs of technology transfer, facilities in good operating
condition and overhauling guarantees in transfer phase.
The CSFs represent a mutually exclusive set of factors that helps to define
the research model of the CSFs with BOT projects in China. The schematic
model reflects the importance and characteristics of the CSFs in developing
the competitive advantage, as well as the distinctive winning elements, in a
BOT project. It provides a useful process model for foreign investors involved
in a BOT project. A total of eight propositions were eventually stipulated for
empirical testing.
To prepare a superior proposal, the promoter must first of all assemble a strong
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team and have a cost-effective solution for the appropriate project. To achieve
the competitive edge in the tender, the promoter must also offer a financial
package that differentiates it from others. Guarantees provided that would
strengthen the financial offers. The winning proposal is dependent on ability
of the promoter to provide the right combination of distinctive winning
elements to the government. After awarded the concession, quality control and
select suitable subcontractor are critical in construction phase. Management
control and training local staff can save operation cost and make the operation
phase smoothly.

To develop a long-term relationship with the Chinese

Government and penetrate

a new market operation

in

good condition,

overhauling guarantees and technology transfer in the transfer phase are
important.

9.2 Limitations
There are several limitations in this study. The application of BOT projects
has a relatively short history all across the world, and especially short in
China. In China, the present BOT projects are mostly at construction and
operational stage except for the Shajiao B thermal station. Therefore, the BOT
method of project development may not be well understood and sometimes
may not be well received by foreign investors and the government agencies
handling it. Consequently, this may affect the accuracy for the selection of the
CSFs.
Because of the limited number of BOT projects in China, longitudinal
research, while preferable, was not possible and, consequently, this research was
obliged to be cross-sectional in nature. Another major inherent limitation of
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the study is the total reliance on the respondents’ memories and personal
opinions. Although this technique has been used widely and often proved
accurate, there are still problems， such as those of biased responses and
omissions. It is true that managing directors are the appropriate source for
information, but the decision

is usually made

by a

group of people.

Furthermore, the model of CSFs in China is only an exploratory one of which
could be modified/tested in the future.

9.3 Recommendations for Future Research
The following aspects are recommendations for future research:
Since few major BOT projects have successfully completed all stages of cycle
( build - operate - transfer ) at the time of the research, more meaningful
comparisons could have been made and other CSFs could be identified in
future; the preferred research method is a longitudinal research approach. As
this research is cross-sectional and for a single point in time, some of the
issues may have not been well represented. Finally, future research should
extend to other developing countries.
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Principal Parties and Contractual Structure of BOT Projects
Principal Parties
BOT projects are usually structured using the undertakings and guarantees of
different parties in a consortium to achieve the equivalent of a bankable credit.
Eight principal parties are typically involved in a BOT project, and each of
those parties has its own objectives and functions:
Principal, Promoter/ Project Company, Investors, Lenders, Contractor, Consultants,
Operator and Users.
The P rin cipal

The principal, usually the host government, government agencies or regulated
monopolies, is the entity for granting the concession and the ultimate owner of
the facility. The objective of the principal is to ensure a reliable, low cost
provision of the facility and to limit their own financial exposure.
P ro m o ter/ P ro je c t com pany

The Project company, usually a single purpose company or the organization
that the concession is being granted to, must ensure that the terms of the
project contracts result in an economically viable project. It is responsible for
securing finance, procuring the design and construction of the project, the
operation of the project during the concession period and the eventual transfer
back to the principal. The project company is also responsible for servicing
the debt incurred in the implementation of the project.
Investors

There are generally two types of investors in the project company. One type is
project sponsors whose participation in the project is not restricted to their
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role is investors. Examples would be

a contractor who intends to

takea role

in the construction of the project; and operating company such as a utility
company which intends to operate the completed project; banks who are
providing loan finance for the project; and the host government.
Other project sponsors are long-term investors whose only interest in the
project is as an investment and who will often play no significant role
management of the project company.

Such investors are normally

in the
institutional

investors or other long-term investors or, members of the public following a
public flotation will not normally be viable until after completion of the
construction phase of the project.
Lenders

In a BOT project, project lenders may include multilateral agencies whose
overriding objective is the economic development of developing nations (such
as the International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank); bilateral
agencies whose purpose is to promote exports from their own country ( such as
export credit agencies); commercial banks who provide syndicated loans, often
in conjunction with bilateral or multilateral guarantees.
Project loans will usually be on a non-recourse or limited recourse basis.
There are certain special considerations for the lenders financing BOT, as
opposed to other, more conventional projects. BOT projects have a complex
risk profile tied to several factors including the length of the term of loan, the
susceptibility to political and economic risk. Thus, project lenders will take
steps to ensure that all obligations established in the project agreement are
met and that the project remains viable so that they can recover their
investment.
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C on tractor

The

contractor’s

goal

is

to

earn 'its (usually

fixed) fee

by

responsibility and the risks for timely project completion, initial
performance， and project cost.

assuming
project

This means that the contractor must be

experienced in all areas needed to bring the project to commercial operation.
Specific

areas

constriction

o f expertise include

engineering

design， risk 'management，

scheduling, procurement,

construction

practices, managing

and

coordinating with sub-contractors, labour relations, transportation and handling of
materials, financing and the ability to maintain positive political relations The
main contractor for the project is 'often also the principal sponsor of the
project.
C onsultants

A wide variety of consultants are involved in BOT projects including financial
consultants, engineers and technical consultants, insurance advisers and legal
advisers. The financial advisers who play a large part in 'structuring BOT
projects, should be familiar with the host country and its capital markets and
financial institutions as well as having experience in the area of privately
financed projects.
O perator

Where the operation' of the privatized facility is complex, it is preferable' to
sub-contract the work to an operator with previous experience in the particular
area of activity. The principal, lenders' and investors may prefer the operator to
be one of the project sponsors and to be committed to the project as a
shareholder for a certain minimum 'time period. Alternatively, the project
company may itself undertake the operation of the facility.
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U sers

Users are the organizations or individuals purchasing the goods or services
produced in the facility (the off-take) or using the facility itself.
Organizational and contractual structure
Due to these varying objectives of the parties discussed above, the project will
go forward only if all reasonable risks and obligations are planned for and
assigned to the appropriate parties. It should be noted that BOT as a project
arrangement tool has significance only for those projects which traditionally
have been implemented by the public sector.
A typical

BOT

structure

illustrating

the

number

of organizations

and

contractual arrangements, while the key contracts include;
Concession agreement, Supply

contract, Off-take

contract, Loan

agreement,

Operations contract; and Construction contract.
C oncession agreem ent

The structured contract between the principal and the promoter is known as
the concession agreement. It is the document that identifies and allocated the
risks associated

with

the

construction, operation

maintenance, finance

and

revenue packages and the terms of the concession relating to a facility. The
preparation and evaluation of a BOT project bid is based on the terms and
project conditions of the structured concession agreement.
Su pply con tract

The Supply contract is that between the supplier and promoter. The supplier
is often a state-owned agency, a private company or a regulated monopoly that
supplies-raw materials to the facility during the operation period.
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Off-take con tract

In contract-led projects - such as power generation plants - a sales or ofF-take
contract is often entered into between the user and the promoter. However, in
market-led project-such as toll roads or estuarial crossing - where revenues are
generated on the basis of directly payable tolls for the use of a facility, an
ofF-take contract is not usually possible.
Loan agreem ent

The loan agreement is the basis of the contract between the lender and the
promoter. Lenders are often commercial banks, niche banks, pension funds or
export credit agencies that provide loans in the form of debt to finance a
particular facility. In most cases one lender will take the lead role for a
lending consortium or a number of syndicated loans.
O peration con tract

The Operation contract is that between the operator and the promoter.
Operators are often drawn from specialist operation companies or companies
created specifically for the operation and maintenance of the particular facility.
Shareholder agreem ent

The shareholder agreement is the contract between the Investors and the
promoter. Investors purchase equity or provide goods in kind and form part of
the corporate structure. These may include suppliers, vendors, constructors and
operators and major financial

institutions as well

as private

individual

shareholders. Investors provide equity to finance the facility, the amount often
determined by the debt/ equity ration required by lenders, or a provision of the
concession agreement.
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C onstruction con tract

The construction contract is made between the constructor and the promoter.
Constructors are often drawn from individual construction companies or a joint
venture of specialist construction companies. Constructors have sometimes
taken the role of promoters for some BOT projects.
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Glossary
Buy-back rate: the rate charged by a utility to a private power developer for
buying back some or all the power the developer is obligated to deliver.
Counter guarantee: a third-party guarantee that is used when one party
purchases a service or a product for monetary payments and this party5s
ability to make payments is in question. This guarantee is required by the
provider of the service or product to ensure that payments will be made.
Cross-subsidies: the allocation of firnds provided by one or more products or
sectors of the economy to other products or sectors of economy. Often this
process is not transparent (e.g.,high prices for industrial users of electricity can
be used to provide subsidies to domestic consumers).
Debt service: periodic payment of principal and interest on loans, bonds, or
fixed/floating-rate notes.
Devaluation: a government action to reduce the value of local currency
against convertible currencies.
Easements: a right given to an individual or group to make limited use of
another’s real property.
Expropriation: a forced transfer of ownership from a private owner to a
government institution.
Financial closing: occurs when all the conditions of lenders and investors have
been met, and financing disbursements can take place.
Franchise: the grant of certain rights to an individual group, partnership, or
corporation, sometimes called a concession.
Hard currency: all major convertible currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, the
British pound, the German mark, the Japanese yen, the French franc, the Swiss
franc, the Dutch guilder.
Home country: the country in which a private investor is registered.
Host country: the country in which the BOT project is taking place.
Indexed tariff: an adjusted tariff, based on a variable such as periodic fuel
price, interest rate (local or foreign), exchange rate, and/or inflation rate.
Implementation agreements: project-specific agreements that provide
government assurances and guarantees to provide power producers required for
successful project development and allocation of risk.
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Irrevocable liquid credit: a guarantee by a commercial bank to provide credit
on demand up to a specified maximum limit. This service is provided by
banks for a fee.
Limited-recourse flnancing: a lending arrangement under which repayment of
a loan and recourse in the event of a default relies mainly on the projecfs
cash flow.
Liquidated damages provisions: specific amounts, with a cap， a construction
contractor is obligated to pay the project company in case of nonperformance
or schedule delays.
Nondiscrimination: avoiding making distinctions between entities outside of
any given and specific evaluation criteria.
Nonrecourse financing: recourse for debt repayment, default, or both belongs
exclusively to the project company.
Peak power: the maximum noninstantaneous electric power in specified period
of time.
Power purchaser: the entity purchasing power from a private power
developer. Usually, the public utility of the host country is the power
purchaser.
Private power developer: an individual, group, or company that develops
power plants on a private basis to build, own, operate, lease, and/or transfer.
Project company: the special-purpose entity that assumes legal and financial
responsibility for construction and operation of the project. Recourse is limited
to the project company.
Project risk: the total risk, including commercial, political, and force majeure
risks.
Rate of return: percentage of return on equity that developers expect from a
project.
Request for proposal (RFP): issued by a utility or government to solicit bids
for a project. It is5collectively, all the covenants, terms, and conditions contained
in the following sections and appendixes: Information for Applicants,
Instructions to Applicants, Performance Specification and any applicable
drawings, draft Implementation Agreement, draft Power Purchase Agreement, and
possible draft Fuel Supply Agreement.
Right of appeal: the right of specified parties to legal arrangements to request
another hearing by a higher authority according to guidelines specified in a
governing law.
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Risk profile: the level of risk due to political, economic, or financial
uncertainty to which an investor is exposed. This determines the rate of return
that an investor requires in order to tolerate exposure to the level of adversity
in any country.
Sovereign guarantee: government guarantee (e.g.， of the obligations of a
purchasing utility under a power purchase agreement).
Tariff: rates charged for the energy, capacity, and miscellaneous services
included in the concession agreement.
Tax holidays: exemptions from some or all taxes for a specified period.
Turnkey contract: a contract given by the project developer to a prime
contractor who will be responsible for the design and implementation of a
project from start to finish, and who will provide a completed, operational
project on a stipulated date, on a lump-sum basis.
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